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 SECURITIZATION OF ENERGY RELATIONS BY POLAND, LATVIA, 
DENMARK AND SWEDEN: THE BUILDING OF NORD STREAM 2 
 
Hanna Rutkovska 
 
Abstract 
 
Over the past years, discussion concerning enhancing ​the security of supply and            
avoiding the fragmentation of EU gas market have a dominated place on the agenda              
of the European Commission, chaired by Jean-Claude Juncker. In this light, the            
proposal of the new pipeline, Nord Stream 2 has raised ​a couple of controversial              
questions. It led to a new tension within an EU-level regarding forming the two              
blocs, ​respectively ​supporters and opponents of the gas project. The thesis aims to             
provide the analysis of the four Member States that have voiced against ​the building              
of the pipeline. The chosen countries consider the Nord Stream 2 project as a              
political tool which might divide the EU inside and ensure the Russian dominance in              
the European energy market. In such a situation, the particular Member States stands             
on blocking it to prevent the inevitable consequences. The research outlines the            
common stance on the gas offshore by analysing the speech acts of Member States'              
political leaders. According to the Copenhagen School, the thesis disputes ​the degree            
of ​securitization which can ​be gained in the particular energy issue. Primarily​, the             
study delves into the initial stage of the securitization known as a securitising             
movement. Hence, the securitising actors, their speech acts and referent objects are            
the essential elements of analysis. Functional actors such as Russia and Germany ​are             
included in the research as well​. Overall, the findings confirm the political            
significance of the energy relation in the context of ​the construction of the pipeline              
and its effect on the further escalation of securitising movement.  
 
Key words​: Nord Stream 2, energy relations, the EU, ​securitizing movement,           
Copenhagen School.  
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 1. Introduction  
 
“I have never seen a commercial project to be so hotly debated by the top leaders of                 
the EU, on so many occasions and for such a long time” ​(Taylor, 2018)​. 
 
By this statement the Vice-President of the European Commission for the Energy            
Union, Maros Šefčovič referred to the current situation on the energy issue, Nord             
Stream 2 (NS2). ​The idea of its building became an attractive deal among the              
Member States of the European Union (MS EU) after the North Gas Pipeline ​is              
known as Nord Stream 1 (NS1) ​firstly ​delivered a gas supply to Europe from Russia.               
In 2012 the engineers with scientists examined the option to construct the third and              
fourth strings of gas offshore in the Baltic Sea and came with the conclusion that               
NS2 might become operational in the future​. Three years after, in June at the              
International Economic Forum in Saint Petersburg, there ​was made an official           
announcement regarding ​the construction of the gas pipeline. Presented as a ​purely            
commercial project, the offshore has raised ​some ​questions at the public debates,            
becoming a controversial issue within the European Union(EU) level. 
The reason for the contradiction ​partly ​lies in the energy situation of the EU. While               
the Union has a high level of dependence on imports, 43% of natural gas ​mostly               
delivered from Russia in 2017 (European Commission, 2018). Consequently,         
ensuring ​the security of energy supply and its diversification have become an internal             
direction of the EU policy. Firstly​, the energy issue ​was brought up to the EU public                
debates in 2009 in the context of the discussion on The Third Energy Package which               
legally ​bound the main principles of the internal energy market. In 2014, the             
European Commission (EC) adopted the European Energy Security Strategy which          
increased the attention to the EU dependency on Russian gas supply. ​Furthermore,            
the creation of Energy Union and its primary objectives became a substantial step             
towards improving renewable energy and energy efficiency. On the background of           
last updates about the EU, the proposal of ​the building of NS2 seems to be               
controversial.  
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 The ongoing project, ​as well as Nord Stream 1, will ​be located ​in the Baltic Sea by                 
passing through the territorial water and Exclusive Economic zone of Russia,           
Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Germany. It will ​consist of twin lines and double the              
capabilities of the first pipeline up to 55 billion cubic meters per year which in terms                
means it will provide 26 million of households by gas (Espoo, 2017). Using the same               
technologies as first two strings, its impact on the environment might ​be seen             
insignificant. The set date of gas transmission via a new pipeline is the end of 2019                
when a transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine will ​be expired​. A sole             
shareholder of this project is Gazprom, who ​is owned ​mainly ​by Russia. The             
Member States that consider this project as a commercial venture, ​actively ​support it.             
Accordingly, German​, Austrian, Dutch and French companies had agreed to          
co-finance this pipeline by 50% of its total cost (Ibid.). 
Despite the fact that NS2 is ​mostly ​similar to NS1 in its description, it ​is brought up                 
to open the debate about the EU-Russia gas relationship among the Member States of              
the European Union. The Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) were the            
first expressed their opposition towards this project. Correctly​, in 2016 eight of them             
had sent a letter to the President of the European Commission to show they              
disagreement to build NS2 and called to block the ongoing project by the EU              
legislative tools. However, the EU institution does not have a mandate over the gas              
project, and ​merely ​the Member States should take a final decision (European            
Commission, 2017, November 8). Up to the present time, there might ​be traced the              
division inside the EU concerning this issue. ​Whereas Finland and Germany had            
already granted a permit ​for the construction of Nord Stream 2 through their             
Exclusive Economic Zones and territorial waters, Denmark and Sweden took a           
stance against their involvement in this project. Hence, CEECs together with some            
Nordic countries put on the agenda the question of pipeline’s controversial nature. 
To trace what unified the CEECs and Nordic states on this issue, the research              
question is - ​how do the particular Member States, ​especially ​Poland, Latvia,            
Denmark, and Sweden, interpret ​the building of NS2? The preliminary objectives of            
MA thesis can ​be summed up as follows​: (1) to scrutinise the relevance of the theory                
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 of securitization towards the energy domain; (2) define what the referent objects of             
securitization in are the context of ​the construction of NS2; (3)and to which extent              
the energy issue can ​be securitised​. 
The research will follow the comparative analysis within the scope mentioned above            
four countries. In detail​, it will use the most different system design, which will help               
to analyse ​the interpretation of the gas pipeline by the individual countries with the              
different backgrounds. Besides the fact that the selected states have an exit to the              
Baltic Sea where might run NS2, it was crucial to take not only countries from CEE                
block that are the first active opponents but also to overcome Nordic states. This              
criteria thus exposes the comparative analysis of securitization among the different           
Member States. The spatial context of the empirical study captures the events from             
the end of 2015 till March 2018. The starting date ​is guided by the official               
announcements of ​the building of NS2 in June 2015. However, as a project ​is not               
completed yet and the political debates among the EU Member States are extensive,             
the research overcame the events until March 2018. 
Regarding the theoretical framework, the thesis applies to the frame of the            
Copenhagen School (CS). ​Whereas the notion of security might have an independent            
context, the scholars of the School argue that it is about the survival of something               
depending on different realms in which an existential threat claims. Energy concern            
has ​been considered as an issue that can ​be threatened in a particular context. To               
justify why the specific theory ​was chosen​, it should ​be taken into the fact the nature                
of energy security. It ​is characterized by the intersubjective feature which also has             
securitization theory (​Szulecki, 2017)​. Second, to pick up this concept ​was guided by             
the primary question of this research: to delve into ​the interpretation of a gas project.               
The theoretical frame pays attention to the process of securitization rather than on             
security as a phenomenon. It may ​be considered that to secure is the focus of theory​,                
in other words, the process how the threat ​is constructed​. Due to the aim of the                
research, the approach will help to trace the process of securitising movement, not             
what security is. 
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 While the School includes two stages of securitization, securitizing movement and           
successful securitization/desecuritization, the research will base on the former one.          
The reason ​why ​only the first stage will ​be examined in the analysis is the issue is                 
still unresolved. The proponents of the Copenhagen School stand out the critical            
elements of a securitising movement such as securitising and functional actors,           
speech acts of the former and referent objects that will be a core in the empirical part                 
of the research. Since securitization theory distinguishes five different dimensions,          
which does not include an energy sector as a separate sector, the thesis will elaborate               
within a synthesis of environmental and dominance of political areas. This approach            
will give a more comprehensive look at different arrows of the securitization process             
in the particular case study. 
The structure of thesis proceeds as follows. The first chapter contains the overview             
of the securitization theory proposed by the scholars of the Copenhagen Research            
Peace Institute. While the first subchapter describes the main elements of the concept             
and their nature, the second one outlines its limitation and reviews of the researchers              
who examined this concept. ​The next chapter bases on the ​methodology of the             
research and operationalisation of dependent and independent variables. ​The third          
chapter, an empirical part, contains the analysis of the speech acts by the securitising              
actors, description of functional actors and discussion of findings. ​The latter one            
gives the insight how the theory applied to the empirical part by the results. ​The               
thesis ends up with a general conclusion of the research. 
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 2. Theoretical framework: the securitization theory of the        
Copenhagen School 
 
As the notion of securitization has a range of different interpretations in the science,              
this work elaborates meaning of this phenomenon by following the Copenhagen           
School. A new framework for security studies has taken its beginning from the             
publication in 1983 of People, States and Fear by Barry Buzan. Afterwards together             
with Buzan, his colleagues at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Ole Waever,            
and Jaap de Wilde, moved beyond the classical security complex theory and            
published several research papers about the process of the securitization in the            
international relations. The first and primary book of the co-founders of the CS is              
Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998), which sets out ​the importance of a              
security issue and its nature outside ​of ​the military sector. Hence, the proponents of              
the CS redefined ​the meaning of security, connected it close with the logic of              
survival.  
At large, a core of the School derives from the constructivism and the critical              
approach in the security studies. The essential principle of constructivism is that            
“people act toward objects, including others actors, by the meanings that objects            
have for them” (Weldt, 1992: 396). Weldt argues that self-help, as defined by the              
realists (Waltz), derives not from anarchy instead from the social interaction. Mostly​,            
it has ​been institutionalised and characterised by the process. Following ​the           
perception of constructivism and its intersubjective idea of international relations, the           
security concept is a ​socially ​constructed, which does not have a constitutive nature             
(Jackson, Sorensen, 2006). 
Beyond the constructivism, another root of the CS derives from Schmitt's concept of             
the political. As Carl Schmitt put it, the political is the realm of an exception in his                 
political theory. ​Similarly ​to this assumption, the frame of securitization theory           
presents a security as “a danger and the exceptional character of security” (Buzan,             
Hansen, 2016: 217). Despite, this common point does not lead these theories to the              
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 same epistemological frame. Schmittian perception of enemy-friend derived from         
Hobbes's ideas, while the proponents of the CS follow a ​socially ​constructed nature             
of the security. ​Thereby, regarding the existential threat as an integral part of the              
Copenhagen School, it reveals on Schmitt’s understanding of the “politics’’ which           
was characterised​ by exclusion and enmity (Williams, 2013).  
Regarding the structure of the CS, the central notions are securitization and            
desecuritization which accommodate the framework to identify how an issue          
involves mentioned above processes. Traditionally​, through the prism of this          
concept, the security can ​be presented as ‘a call to defend a not-yet-existing social              
order’ (Waever, 1995: 74). It ​is deemed that moving issues into a security frame ​is               
different from those that would ensure if handled in a non-security mode. As set out               
by the proponents of the concept, in the international relations an issue becomes a              
security issue, not because of an ​objective threat to the state, but rather an actor has                
defined something like an existential threat. Importantly​, this process follows the key            
condition in practice such as ‘the capacity of actors to make ​socially ​effective claims              
about threats’ (Williams, 2003). The epistemological platform, thus, connects with          
the speech act analysis, which was first discovered by John Austin in his series of               
lectures (1962) known as the concept of “performative utterances” and later           
developed by Ole Waever (1995). 
In detail, the theory presents the five key sectors of security: military, environmental,             
economic, societal and political. Beyond this clear division, the frame of the CS does              
not exclude the synthesis of these spheres. Traditionally​, the military realm ​strongly            
institutionalised, and a state is the most important ​in a sense ​it ​is presented by               
governments or political elites who have a right to use the power (Buzan et al.,               
1998). ​Furthermore, the environmental domain ​is characterised by two distinct          
agenda such as political and scientific, which are ​mainly ​interdependent. Societal ​is            
based upon the concept of identity and claims ​that ​a threat ​is presented regarding the               
survival as a community (Ibid.). The economic sphere deals with political features as             
prevails in the public debates and its nature derives from liberalism. Finally​, the             
political domain is ​an extensive one and ​usually ​overlaps with other mentioned            
10 
 realms. Still, all these sectors can ​be synthesised as securitization theory does not             
exclude the cross-sectoral dynamic. 
Moreover, the proponents of the CS distinguishes four levels of securitization           
regarding units: global, non-regional subsystemic, regional and local. ​Taking into          
account the two ways of classification by sectors and units, Buzan stands with the              
idea that “units do not exist in sectors, sectors exist in units as different ​types of                
security concerns” (Buzan et al., 1998: 168). ​In other words, the actors can refer to               
the different perceptions of the threat at the same time such as economic, military              
and political etc. Derived from the classification; it can ​be seen that the CS does not                
frame the energy security as a sector. The reason is the lack of ​entirely ​separated               
values from economics and its nature which has a multidimensional scope within            
various actors and directions. Accordingly, the research will tie into the synthesis of             
environmental and political spectrums within ​the dominance of​ latter. 
2.1. The structural elements of the Copenhagen School 
As it appears from the theory, the issue ​is considered ​being securitised ​in the case               
when the particular audience recognises it as such​. The central idea of securitization             
is not a sign referring to something more real, it is the expression itself which is                
well-known as an act. The security act ​is not defined ‘by uttering the word security,               
rather ​the definition of an existential threat requiring emergency action and ​the            
acceptance of that designation by a significant audience’ (Buzan et al.1998: 27). It is              
important to mention that scholars of the CS divide a nature of the issue in three                
dimensions such as non-politicised, politicised and securitised. The initial stage is           
non-politicized in the sense that a topic does not include in the agenda of public               
debates. Commonly​, this issue is a concern of private sector and does not have              
enough importance to ​be discussed in the political spectrum. Contrary to this issue,             
the politicised point ​is considered ​in the public debate, which can ​be solved by the               
government or other political institutions of its competence (Buzan et al. 1998). ​In             
this case​, Waever gives an example of a topic of gender which moves from              
non-politicized to politicised scopes (Waever, 2003).  
11 
 And, the last dimension ​is securitised in ​the scope of ​which the issue demands the               
emergency actions beyond the established rules within the political system (Emmers,           
2016). Notably​, any item can shift to mentioned above dimensions, which in term             
means that non-politicised topic can become the securitised issue if it follows all             
conditions within the frame of the CS. The securitization domain is characterised by             
an intersubjective structure., which involves not only the securitising actors but also            
presents the functional actors and the audience. At the same time as securitization is              
ahead of politicisation known as its intensification, it can ​be even considered as an              
opposed process. Politicization marks an issue open for public debate and might ​be             
solved under the existing system. However, a securitised point requires the extra            
actions to deal with it. ​In other words, it is out of the realm of the political system as                   
at this level there are not powerful enough tools to block a threat. Hence,              
securitization is in the frame of emergency as a more urgent task than others issues. 
Emphasizing a specific rhetorical structure of securitization, including survival,         
Weaver stresses about ​the priority of action and urgency, which functions as a tool              
for finding a security action in other sectors beyond the scope the military-political             
dimension (Waever, 2003). The securitization functions as a phenomenon to shift the            
existential issue from one level to another. Through the prism of the CS, ‘an issue ​is                
dramatised and presented as an issue of supreme priority; by labelling it as security;              
an agent claims a need for and a right to treat is as an extraordinary issue’(Buzan et                 
al.1998: 26). On that ground, one of the critical targets of the securitization theory is               
to answer the question how the issue has become securitised and accepted by the              
audience. 
Besides mentioned above three dimensions, the CS also points out two main stages             
of securitization, which should ​be adhered to make it succeed. At the first stage              
persons or subjects with a legitimate power put on the agenda the issue which can ​be                
seen as an existing threat to the referent object. Generally, the initiator of this              
movement can be ‘state or non-actors such as trade unions or popular movements’             
(Emmers 2016: 170). In the traditional perspective, all acts of securitization involve            
the political decisions and flow out from the political and social actions. The second              
12 
 stage ​is completed only in case if audience shares the view of the securitising actors               
on a specific issue as a threat and extraordinary measure ​are handled to prevent a               
threat.  
In the context of the case study, the securitization will ​be analysed from the initial               
stage of energy relations, economic sphere to a logic of survival, applying to the              
question of ​the construction of NS2. Thus, ​it can be possible to trace how the issue                
has shifted from the politicised context to the securitised scope. According to these             
stages of the securitization, ​the perception of the gas pipeline as a threat derives from               
the EU Member States which are securitising actors. ​Nonetheless, there is no            
evidence which proves ​the implementation of the second stage: NS2 is the ongoing             
project, followed by the debates among the EU MS. 
As it has noted above, an integral part of the process of securitization is a speech act:                  
“it is by labelling something a security issue ​that ​it becomes one” (Wæver 2004: 13).               
To begin with, John Austin (1962) and John Searle (1969) elaborated the speech act              
theory. The former pointed out that ​making a statement or ​giving a description is              
mostly ​similar to performing an act, making a promise or ​giving a warning​. ​The idea               
of Austin​’s concept is to describe the reality by uttering certain statements without a              
judgement what is true and false. ​Thereby, the researcher underlined ​the importance            
of the so-called “felicity conditions” by the uttering a performative sentence. ​In other             
words, these conditions ​are characterised by the situation when the speaker ​indicates            
a speech action where some convention exists. In substance, there ​are a certain             
person and circumstances, in which the speaker performs the act in a specific way to               
point out his/her future tasks. As follows, with this intention, a hearer reacts to it in a                 
certain way (Oishi, 2006). Consequently, Austin highlights ​the importance of          
performative utterance which lies not in “true conditions”, but rather “felicity           
conditions” (Stitzel, 2007: 361).  
Furthermore, the speech acts are various in forms such as illocutionary, locutionary            
and perlocutionary usages. More attention in Austin’s theory ​is devoted to the            
illocutionary act than to the locutionary and perlocutionary acts. This ​particular           
usage has ​been characterised by asking/answering a question, giving ​some          
13 
 information or a warning, announcing a verdict/intention. (Austin, 1975).         
Notwithstanding​, the scholar identifies the specific problem which might appear in           
analysing this ​type of ​speech acts. In fact, ​a couple of different senses of expression               
are vague enough “in what way are we using it” that can reflect locutionary act or                
perlocutionary acts (Ibid, 99p.). The perlocution has​, in turn, the common           
consequences and emphasises the effect on the hearer or reader. ​From Austin’s            
perspective, thus, the speech-act theory is a performative dimension in any use of             
language, in which to say something is to do something. 
The professor of the University of California, John Searle further developed the            
speech act theory. According to Searle’s concept, there are two types of the             
principles of behaviour such as regulatory and constitutive. The former reflects ​the            
regulation of existing forms of a behaviour, in contrary to the latter one, which              
constitutes an act of the existence that ​is logically dependent on the rules. Thus, the               
primary hypothesis of his book is “speaking a language is performing acts”            
according to constitutive rules, which ​takes into account the difference between           
merely ​uttering sounds and performing speech acts (Smith, 2003: 9). Comparing           
with Austin’s concept, it can ​be concluded that Searle also pointed out the             
conventional force of the speech acts. ​Moreover, he went further in his research and              
examined ​the nature of ​(incomplete) speech act of predication which Austin did not             
mention. 
Upon Weaver's arguments, the utterance might ​be accepted as the primary reality, in             
which the word “security” is an act (Waever, 1995). Although a successful speech             
act is ​a combination of language and society, the instinct features of speech is a               
group of some community which ​authorises and recognises that speech. Essentially​,           
it requires referent objects in the sense of things which would ​be existentially             
threatened​. While a state or its authority uses “security” in the speech acts, it shifts               
particular issue into a specific area and ​thereby, ​claims a special right to take the               
actions (whatever they mean) which are necessary to block the potential threat.            
(Ibid.). The external aspect of a speech act has two special conditions: one is a               
securitising actor, who must be ​in the position of authority, another condition has to              
14 
 deal with a threat. Still, Waever defines that sometimes the speech act might ​be              
failed​. The condition of this unsuccessful process occurs when “the securitizer is            
raising the stakes and investing ​some ​risk of losing sovereignty to fence a specific              
challenge” (Waever, 1995: 61). In the post-structuralist usage of the speech act            
theory, ​the meaning of the particular speech act ​is equally constituted by its ​possible              
success and failure - one is not primary and the another ​is derived​. 
As to the study case, the speech acts ​explicitly ​cover in which dimensions the project               
reflects a threat. In substance, the attention pays on the speech acts of the EU               
Member States as the securitising actors, their actual context and explicit meaning. It             
should ​be noted that speech acts also comprise a non-verbal communication such as             
slapping someone on the back can be an act of aggression or congratulation, albeit,              
this research will look at ​merely ​a verbal communication as the selected data are in a                
written form. 
Traditionally ​a ​securitization comprises referent object, ​securitizing and ​functional         
actors which will ​be analyzed ​below​. The Copenhagen School sets out a ​clear line of               
distinguishing between ​securitizing actor and analyst. A security issue comes from           
the ​securitizing actor, not from an analyst, thus, the former decides whether            
something can ​be presented as an existential threat. ​Nonetheless, the key role of             
analysts is to find a sense of ​actor​’s speech acts (Buzan et al.,1998). The ​area of their                 
competence ​also includes the judgement of political announcements which then          
might widespread among the audience. While being an influential unit ​in the process             
of securitization, analysts do not have the power to declare an issue as an urgent one                
because it requires the specific measures. ​Thereby, the main ​function of analysts is to              
review the speeches of the ​securitizing​ actor.  
The notion of ​securitizing actors can ​also ​be confused with a referent object in the               
analysis of securitization ​process​. Simultaneously​, a state might ​be considered of           
both an object and an actor (Waever, 2003). The scholars of the CS suggest drawing               
a ​clear line between the ​referent objectives and actors. Since ​some politicians or             
governments talk on behalf of the state, these actors follow the imposed discursive             
rules, and speak ​in a sense ​of identity, nation (Buzan ​et al​, 1998). Although, ​it is                
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 bare to consider that the nation is acting (Ibid.). On the whole, having a complex and                
both-sided nature, to ​identify the ​securitizing actors is an important ​element for an             
appropriate​ research of securitization.  
To be a ​securitising actor does not mean to utter “security” or ‘“threat”. Albeit, the               
frame of the CS distinguishes two ​substantial principles which the ​securitizing actors            
have to follow. The first one is well-known as internal and linguistic-grammatical            
which includes the rule of the act. The second principle is more external which have               
to ​maintain an ​initial context “from which the act can ​be made​” (​Balzacq, 2005:              
172)​. In words of the CS, while security ​is ascertained by actors, a frame of security                
is subjective (Buzan et al., 1998: 31). ​Nevertheless, even following these principles            
there is no guarantee that the speech act ​which is uttered by the ​securitizing actors               
will ​be succeeded​: “Successful securitization ​is not decided by the ​securitizer​, but by             
the audience of the security speech act” (Buzan et al. 1998: 31). Consequently, the              
essential concern of ​securitizing actors is to give ​the feeling of the common fear              
which the audience ​would ​share​. As has ​been mentioned above, we cannot talk ​about              
a complete subjective nature as a security issue is not something that agents             
determined alone. ​More importantly, the ​process of securitization ​also requires the           
interaction between actors with the audience to ​determine something as a threat. It             
might ​be underlined that securitization is more likely intersubjective and ​socially           
constructed, which ​in turn ​means it lays neither with the objects nor with the subjects               
but among the subjects (Ibid.).  
The securitising concept identifies securitising actors as the legitimate leaders, who           
have power over the people within the determined territory. Since a state composed             
of a set of political institutions such as a legislature, executive and military forces,              
these units take the legal decisions (Wilson, 1996). ​For this reason, securitising            
actors, ​particularly ​political entities, have the competence to start the process of            
securitization by being a general voice of security. With this intention, in the case              
study, the securitising actors are politicians of the EU Member States who give the              
speech acts and raise the question of security threat in the media. For instance,              
Latvian Prime Minister, Polish Member of the European Parliament, Lithuanian          
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 deputies, Swedish armed forces chief ​are presented in the case study as securitising             
actors who claimed a threat on behalf of their countries. Besides the securitising             
actors, there are also scientists, experts in ​the field of ​political science and energy,              
which can ​be counted as analysts. Their speech acts and opinion articles ​give an              
understandable explanation of what actors uttered such as Espoo reports, Rilley's           
articles  about ​the construction of​ the pipeline (Buzan et al., 1998).  
Functional actors are one of the separate units of the securitization, although they are              
not securitising actors. Principally​, it should ​be noted that they are not referent             
objects because of having a different nature and the roles in the process of              
securitization. The critical feature of these actors is that they can influence the             
dynamic of securitization. Depending on the issue which might ​be securitised​, they            
can ​be presented by private companies, NGOs, etc. Regarding the case study,            
Gazprom on behalf of Russia and Germany are the functional actor stimulate ​the             
building of the pipeline and in the meantime gives ​some ​dynamic to the process. On               
the one hand, Russia and Germany can ​be considered the significant countries            
directly ​involved in the constructing of NS2 and ​do not make any efforts to securitise               
the project and energy relations. Presenting the pipeline as a ​purely ​commercial            
venture, they insist on implementation of the gas project on time.  
As has ​been mentioned above, security has the distinct meanings within being varied             
in forms. At any rate, the Copenhagen School relies on “security” which means             
survival in the face of existential threats. The question what defines an existential             
threat is not the same across different sectors. Markedly​, the existential threat ​is             
rightly interpreted ​in connection with the referent object (Buzan et al. 1998). The             
referent object is an entity which ​is threatened and has a legitimate right to survival.               
In other words, the referent object is that to which one can point ​that ​it should                
survive. Individuals or groups, ​as well as issues such as national sovereignty,            
environment, economy, can ​be defined as the referent objects in the speech acts of              
the securitising actors (Emmers, 2016). 
Together with proponents, Buzan acknowledged that a size/scale is an essential           
variable in determining what makes up a successful referent object of security. They             
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 distinguish three levels such as middle, system and micro. Among these types, the             
middle one ​is considered ​being the most fruitful generator of referent objects (Buzan             
et al.,1998). This conclusion derives from the key feature of a referent object to              
establish security legitimacy, which bureaucracies, political regimes seldom hold it.          
Then, in some sense, ​merely ​a state has the legitimacy to be security referent.              
Consequently, it might have seen that the state-centric position predetermines in the            
Copenhagen School. To reject this fact​, its proponents argue that security is an area              
of the competing actors in which the state ​is privileged in the historical dimension as               
the actor who ​usually ​handles with security, thus, the theory ​is bottomed on the              
state-dominated field instead of on a state-centric approach (Ibid.). 
As the referent object has been a state, in this research ​the construction of the               
pipeline ​is presented as an existential threat to the national interests of the EU              
Member States, those who pointed out the projects as a threat. With this in mind, the                
agents such as Poland, Latvia, Sweden and Denmark labelled NS2 as an issue of              
supreme priority. Besides, some of these states, ​specifically ​Poland, Latvia and           
Denmark, has marked that the gas project can threaten the goals of the EU energy               
policy. Although the reality ​does underline that not all Member States assume the             
transmission pipeline as a threat: neither Germany nor Finland presents the pipeline            
as a threat to gas supply instead they accept the project as a beneficial commercial               
deal. 
One of the distinct features of successful securitization is the extraordinary measures            
which have ​been characterised by being beyond the normal politics. This assumption            
derives from the idea that an ordinary politics follows the permanent rules ​without             
any exceptions. The proponents of the CS ​ascertain that an exceptional nature of the              
issue determines the successful securitization (Floyd, 2015: 4). Regarding spatial          
time, the exceptional measures should ​be handled ​immediately ​with all existing           
efforts and legitimate power. ​The adaptation of these acts require the clear            
determination what can ​be considered as an enemy and can be different, depending             
on the context and circumstances (Emmers., 172). ​Moreover, the scholars of the CS             
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 brings out that under the extraordinary measure can ​be understood regarding actions            
that should block further development of threat (Buzan et al., 1998). 
Using the notion of the extraordinary measures, there ​is raised the question what             
might perceive as an ordinary scope. Following Waever’s idea, the theory ​is            
structured upon institutional history less than a rhetorical nature, hence, in the            
theoretical dimension, there is a clear division between two notions unlikely to the             
practice (Waever, 2003). It is important to clarify that in the securitising move the              
extraordinary measures is unnecessary, rather a cornerstone of this process is a            
speech act. In contrast, the successful securitization lays down on an implementing            
of the exceptional measures as ​the consequence of the audience acceptance.           
However, after ​the utterance of a speech act by securitising actors, there is still a               
choice to decide in which way the existential threat should ​be addressed whether it              
might be standard a legislative procedure or the extraordinary measures (Emmers,           
2016). ​For that reason, there ​are a lot of securitised issues, but not the whole               
successful securitization. Since the existential measures ​are imposed​, the last step of            
an entire process of securitization is the effects on inter-units relations (Buzan et al.,              
1998). All changes which occur after breaking the rules can have a wide range of               
consequences which might increase the tension in relations between the particular           
parties. The CS does not pay enough attention to this area as its fundamental purpose               
is to explore how some issue shifts toward the securitised spectrum.  
Regarding the case study, to define the extraordinary measures is irrelevant to some             
extent. The European Commission, ​as well as the Member States, can adopt the             
extraordinary measures which would cause ​the cancellation of the Nord Stream 2            
pipeline. Denmark and the European Commission took the first step to handle the             
extraordinary measures. Thus, on November 8, 2017, the institution proposed to           
amend the Gas Directive (2009/73/EC) to ensure the transparency and efficiency of            
all pipelines. However, to identify most of the extraordinary measures is possible            
only in the speech acts of securitising actors regarding the proposal as the discussion              
on NS2 continues, and there is no visible evidence to assume that the extraordinary              
measures will ​be implemented​. 
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 Beyond the securitising and functional actors, and the referent objects, an essential            
role in the process of securitization plays the audience which is an observer and a               
decider of the whole process. At large, a securitised issue is ​a consequence of the               
negotiations between actors and audience (Buzan et al., 1998). In the light of the CS,               
this structural element emphasises the intersubjective nature of the securitization          
(Waever, 2003). ​In essence, the successful securitization happens when the audience           
is convinced ​in the existence of threat and support ​the implementation of            
extraordinary measures to reduce the possibility of danger. A ​particular ​group of            
people who agree on a specific speech act presents an appropriate audience (Buzan et              
al. 1998). Commonly​, Buzan and Waever understand the politicians, military officers           
as the audience. Thus ​the scope of ​the CS ​is not extended on the broader units such                 
as the population of a state, because even its rejection of recognising a potential              
threat can lead to the successful securitization(Emmers, 2016). With this in mind, the             
securitising actors should convince mentioned above elites and or state institutions to            
move the politicised issue on the securitised scope (Ibid.). Albeit it depends on the              
context in which the existential threat occurs, for instance, in case of national             
security, the population/citizens are the critical audiences. 
Concerning the research, the European Commission and the other EU Member States            
that are not the securitising actors can ​be considered as the audience which can              
accept ​the fact ​that a referent object ​is threatened​. In case this condition would ​be               
fulfilled​, an emergency measure can ​be imposed​. Contrary to this, if the European             
Commission does not accept ​the existence of a threat, it will be impossible to              
legitimise extraordinary action and ​thereby, ​since here we can talk only about            
debates in economic and somehow political scopes (Buzan et al. 1998). It underpins             
that a securitising movement can more likely characterise the process of           
securitization in the dimension of NS2 as in the current situation there is no specific               
legal frame of acceptance of a threat by the European Commission rather the ​attempt              
to challenge a further development to construct the pipeline. In particular, the            
essential functions of the European Commission has its President, Jean-Claude          
Juncker. Albeit he has also given speech acts on ​the construction of NS2 ​as well as                
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 the Vice-President of the European Commission, Maroš Šefčovič, and thus, they can            
be the securitising actors by the meantime.  
Derived from the mentioned above elements, the process of securitization seems to            
be one of the other ways of an intense politicisation. The ​successful securitization             
postulates an existential threat, then raises a question of emergency response, and            
lastly ​undertakes actions to prevent a specific threat. All these stages should not ​be              
presented in the single dimension of the best ​possible ​way to handle ​some ​issue;              
contrary they appear in case when an issue impossible to handle in a political              
context. Consequently, the Copenhagen School also covers the possibility of          
desecuritization such as a flip side of securitization: “the more security, the less             
insecurity and vice-versa” (Waever, 2003: 12). 
As Buzan highlighted, desecuritization is ​a consequence of a long-range option in            
which an issue does not anymore threaten, and actors ​do not have any             
countermeasure (Buzan 1998:29). ​Thereby, by shifting threats into challenges and          
security into ‘normal politic’, it has ​been characterised as the process of            
desecuritization. A vast array of analysis argues that desecuritization does not apply            
to the question of security or ​a presence of an existential threat. Since ​the nature of                
this process can ​be examined​, it ​is limited in the further research as there is not the                 
object of systematic analysis (Waever, 2003). ​Notwithstanding​, desecuritization can         
play a beneficial role as it functions by introducing an issue anew into a politicised               
dimension, which in turn means that any ​attempt to secure can ​be avoided by              
desecuritising the issue (Emmers, 2016). Given this discourse, the securitization          
theory does not ​have a function to determine what “security should be/not be” rather              
it reveals the key question — “what does security do”(Taureck, 2006). 
By analysing upon these notions, in the particular case study, to determine ​the             
position of ​the construction of NS2 either it is a securitised or desecuritised issue will               
be ​partly ​irrelevant as the point remains unresolved and securitising actors continue            
to make the speech acts. The ongoing pipeline ​is intensively discussed within an EU              
level to the extent in which particular MS such as Poland, Latvia, Denmark and              
Sweden are trying to shift the issue from a rational political aspect into a securitised               
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 dimension. ​Thereby, it should ​be concluded that project ​is involved in the process of              
securitization, but talking about its consequences either success or failure is much too             
early. 
2.2. Criticism and limitation of the Copenhagen School 
Beyond a comprehensive and structured basis of Copenhagen School, there ​are a            
series of limitations set out by other scholars who examined the different aspects of              
the concept of securitization in their works. To begin with, Michael C. Williams and              
Keith Krause, known as founders of Critical Security School (CSS), clarify ​the            
limitation of Copenhagen School, firstly​, of its ​attempt to distinguish the state and             
society. While the concept of the securitization uses the dual dimension of the             
security such as state security, which applies to sovereignty and societal security            
under which identity is the primary concern, proponents of the CSS disagree on this              
classification of security. They argue that society is in the risk to ​be wrongly              
understood as this notion cannot be synonymous with an individual nor with a state              
(Krause, Williams, 1996: 243). ​Thereby, the incorrect labelling of security types           
creates ​some ​gap ​in the interpretation of​ security. 
Furthermore, the root of criticism lies ​on the basis of Copenhagen School - the              
speech-act theory. The scholars of CSS gave ​a couple of reasons ​why ​the latter              
damages the concept of securitization. ​First and foremost​, a speech act limits the             
security agenda, which ​in turn ​means it puts ​some ​restrictions in the theoretical             
dimension at the same time as ​the nature of ​security is unlimited (Ibid.). ​Moreover, it               
follows ​a conclusion of the Copenhagen School that not all acts of an utterance can               
be ​socially ​active and only the individual actors can ​be powerful to make a              
reasonable statement. ​For this reason, a creation of the particular conditions of            
successful speech act by Buzan and Waever provoked ​the limitation of the concept of              
securitization by defining actors and analysing the speech acts. 
In the same direction, Mat Mcdonald and Thierry Balzacq examine the weaknesses            
of a speech act concept of the Copenhagen School. To begin with, Mcdonald states              
that a form, context and nature of an act are narrow. ​First and foremost​, a limited                
22 
 way means ​that ​it focuses ​merely ​on a speech act of dominant actors, neglecting              
other modes of the acts which do not have a legal basis. Following the language, the                
images, bureaucratic practices and physical actions are out of the Copenhagen           
School (Mcdonald, 2008). Since the framework of visual securitization developed by           
Lene Hansen will be a useful tool to go beyond language and test new aspects               
(Hansen, 2011). From analysing only the speech act of significant actors, there is a              
missing linkage how the marginal actors can challenge a labelled threat to security.             
Consequently, this limitation creates a normative implication which in terms          
prevents an in-depth analysis of a case study. 
A context of the act has a place in the analysis since a moment of intervention, and,                 
thus, a range of substantial processes is beyond ​the scope of ​the securitization theory.              
While a threat ​is determined ​entirely without any attention to ​the way in which              
“security can ​be understood in the particular context”, the nature of an act is narrow               
(Ibid., 564). The conditions of performing the speech act are neglecting, as the             
proponents of the School focus on the form and context. Thus, the strict requirements              
in which securitization occurs are under-theorized. As McDonald argued, ​whereas          
Buzan and Waever pointed out “the facilitating conditions” and audience as the            
elements of the securitization, they did not ​tightly ​incorporate them to the theory             
(McDonald, 2008). Accordingly, the scholar suggests concentrating on the context in           
which one security issue overcomes others by underpinning mentioned above          
elements to the theory.  
As well as Mcdonald, Thierry Balzacq, a ​Francqui Research Chair recognizes the            
external context as the leading dimension to explore in-deep the process of            
securitization. The articulation cannot be an appropriate tool to describe the security            
in reality as the process overcomes different aspects. ​Nevertheless, the researcher           
points out that ‘felicity condition” as compulsory requirements of success ​especially           
reduces ​the meaning of security in real life. ​For this reason, he acknowledges that a               
better way to investigate the securitization is to use the pragmatic approach which             
implies to the context, the psycho-cultural actions of the audience, and the interaction             
between speaker and listener (Balzacq, 2005). The essential difference between the           
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 his proposed method and speech-act frame of analysis is that a former uses different              
artifacts to pursue that a threat exists, controversy, the latter creates the universal             
principles of utterance, which by themselves restricts ​the scope of ​the process of             
securitization.  
Furthermore, the scholar pays significant attention to the role of the audience which             
is the main element in occurring the successful securitization. In Balzacq’s view, the             
School disregards this part in terms it does not explain ​in detail ​the target audience               
for the speech acts of securitizing actors. By his criticism “...although the CS appeals              
to an audience, its framework ignores that audience, which suggests that the CS opts              
for an illocutionary view of security yielding a ‘magical efficiency’ rather than a             
full-fledged model encompassing perlocution as well” (Balzacq, 2005: 177). Hence          
if perlocution act does not comply with the guideline of realization of an             
illocutionary one, Austin’s theory of speech act on which ​is based the CS ​is              
insufficient to handle with “discursive politics of security” (Ibid.). Therefore, the           
pragmatic act of security is a comprehensive option which prevents a language            
limitation of theory and give a detail insight  a threat in the linguistic scope.  
The idea of adding externalism in the securitization theory ​is also tightly connected             
with criticism of Holger Stritzel, a professor at the King’s College London. While             
the concept of the CS includes three essential elements such as a speech act,              
securitizing actors, and audience, it does not give an appropriate clarification of the             
interaction between actors and audience (Stritzel, 2007). The strict split of these two             
units has led to the general relationship which being analysed only in ​the context of               
the securitizing attempt. In substance, the theory avoids the analysis of a potential             
audience and all elements of any power of non-decision (Ibid.). Thus, Stritzel            
suggests building a sufficient background of ​the existence of a social sphere.            
Moreover, the scholar brings out a range of contradiction which are ​partly ​explicit in              
reading the securitization theory. A division between the securitizing actors and           
referent objects as a static element makes the concept less dynamic and more             
conditional. Another example of this feature is a permanent concentration on the            
speech act events as a cornerstone of the CS. Stritzel highlights that Waever had tried               
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 to use the approach of internationalism to improve theory by investigating its            
negative-side effects. ​Notwithstanding​, Waever’s improvement made the theory        
more complicated to understand, and as a result, it is less applicable to an empirical               
case to get a comprehensive analysis. 
For that reasons, Stritzel sets out the critical areas in which the frame of the CS can                 
be improved​. Firstly​, a strategic-relational approach is a relevant tool to integrate            
socially ​linguistic discourse and to go further in analyzing ​a construction of threats             
through the constructivism prism (Ibid.). Likewise, an appropriate investigation of          
the social and political structure behind privileged actors will give a comprehensive            
overview to understand the nature of a threat. Finally​, a sufficient link between the              
text and the more extensive discursive practices will add to the theory the             
socio-linguistic contexts; ​thereby, ​the method will ​be fulfilled by externalism for a            
more coherent reading of securitization.  
Besides mentioned above limitation, ​a couple of questions raised to the distinct            
feature of the Copenhagen School, the European frame of security concerns by Pinar             
Bilgin and Juha A. Vuori. Referring to the core of the Aberystwyth School (the              
Welsh School), the above object the process of desecuritization as such​. Mainly​,            
Bilgin explains three reasons ​why ​it is more relevant to use politicizing security             
instead of desecuritization (Bilgin, 2013). Respectively​, the strategic, ethic-political         
and analytical dimensions are narrow meanings. Assuming from the beginning that           
the Copenhagen School is limited how state authorities use security, politicizing           
security deepens the notion security in this context and can handle with its             
militaristic understandings (Ibid.). ​Moreover, Bilgin examined the securitization        
theory by analysing Turkey’s way of accession to the European Union. By his             
research, the notion of security in the frame of the CS described from a Western               
European perspective. ​As such, Waever had applied to social security as a response             
to some objection of the European integration, and later this concept ​was discussed             
in the analysis of European cases. Accordingly, Bilgin brings out that securitization            
cannot ​be used outside the EU-wide framework as it has a substantial limitation to              
deal with the peripheral states of the international relations (Bilgin, 2011). 
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 The line of controversy about a standard frame of securitization ​is also presented in              
Vuori’s criticism. Meanwhile, at the international stage, there are the diverse political            
systems. However, Buzan and Waever ​took into account ​merely ​a democratic           
society to analyse the process of securitization. Their concept follows the democracy            
as an integral part of politics and, thus, the securitization is limited beyond the              
community where it has a no-EU perception of democracy. In totalitarian social            
systems, to determine any other state as an enemy is in ​the scope of ​“normal               
politics”, hence, in this sense, the speech act can ​be derived from other objectives              
than “legitimizing the breaking rules” (Vuori, 2008: 69). This difference in societies            
also depends on various core values, historical backgrounds and perception of the            
international relations. As a result, Vuori tries to combine the philosophical and            
linguistic dimensions of speech act’s approach to apply a notion of securitization in             
non-democratic systems.  
In sum, after ​the creation of a new framework of security studies by the proponents               
of CS, this theory has ​been examined by some researchers who came with substantial              
criticism. Firstly​, the limitation reveals to a speech act concept ​which is limited in a               
form, nature and context. Secondly​, the critical scrutiny reflects to the externalism of             
the theory regarding a broad background and insufficient link between actors and            
audience. And last, but not at least, the Eurocentric approach is the main frame of the                
securitization concept that makes it weak ​in many cases beyond Western dimension.            
For instance, to trace the process of securitization within the non-democratic           
community will raise the questions i when it can ​be considered the breaking rules,              
who has a legitimate power to claim threat and so on. Therefore, ​whereas the theory               
has various arrows of criticism regarding its structure and frame, the empirical part             
will ​be based on its cornerstone, the speech act approach which will help to gain a                
better understanding what security does in ​the context of ​the Nord Stream 2 project.  
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 3. Methodology​ and data 
Due to the research question of this paper, ​the dependent variable of the study is ​the                
securitization of the energy relation​, and, the independent is ​the changes in the             
geopolitical environment which influence on the former phenomenon. ​The direction          
of influence will ​be determined by represented further research. A method focuses on             
the examining the similarities and differences among states in the context of ​the             
construction of the Nord Stream 2 project and the research follows the case-oriented             
approach. 
To provide a clear linkage between independent and dependent variables, the           
empirical part of the research follows comparative analysis. This method          
distinguishes two types of comparisons such as ‘large​-​N’ and ‘small-N’ where N is ​a              
number of countries, depending on ​the scope of ​countries and the level of abstraction              
(Landman, 2000). Regarding the research question which ​is underpinned by the four            
EU Member States, the comparison of few countries might ​be considered as            
‘small-N’ type, particularly​, ‘small-4’. The method of comparing few countries also           
has own classification, found on similarities and differences. These methods ​are           
known in the science as ‘most similar systems design’​(​MSSD) and ‘most different            
systems design’​(​MDSD). The core target of the former is to define the differences             
among similar units, despite the latter one which takes different units to tend their              
similarities. In this research, there will ​be used ‘most similar system design’            
(MDSD), which logic sets out in ​a given initial difference among systems within a              
similar outcome (Meckstroth, 1975: 137). Thus, there ​is chosen four EU Member            
States such as Poland, Latvia, Denmark and Sweden which have the different            
backgrounds, but all of them have a common aim in terms of ​the construction of the                
transmission pipeline (Table 1). The chosen method will help to find out why             
relatively ​distinct MS are striving to block ​the building of the second branch of Nord               
Stream,​ as a comparison will draw the key explanatory factor.  
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 Table 1. Case selection with a most different system design.  
Criteria/ 
Countries 
 
Geopolitical 
location 
Historical 
background 
Accession to 
the EU 
 
NS2 as a threat  
Poland Central-Eastern 
Europe 
Polish United 
Workers’ Party 
(communist bloc) 
New MS 
(enlargement 
2004)  
Yes 
Latvia Central-Eastern 
Europe 
Part of the USSR New MS 
(enlargement 
2004)  
Yes 
Denmark Northern Europe Social  
Democratic Party 
  Old MS 
(1973) 
Yes 
Sweden Northern Europe Social 
 Democratic Party 
Old MS 
(1995) 
Yes 
Source: author’s own elaboration. 
3.1. Operationalization and conceptualization of variables 
 
The independent variable is presented ​by the geopolitical changes, which in turn            
means the political alteration such as the increasing tension with Russia. The            
EU-Russia relations have gotten worse by the political events after annexation           
Crimea in 2014. In response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, the EU has adopted a               
series of sanctions, ending bilateral cooperation and freezing EU assets of individuals            
close to the regime. Up to now, EU sanctions against Russia remain in place and will                
be on the agenda of the EU foreign policy as long as Russia will ​be willing to                 
contribute to the solving the conflict. The High Representative of the European            
Union of Foreign Affairs/ Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica          
Mogherini announced that Russia cannot ​be seen as a strategic partner of the             
European Union (David, 2014). According to the latest Brussels’ policy, a current            
mistrust between the EU and Russia is a substantial obstacle to their future             
relationship.  
Beyond ​the deterioration of EU-Russia relations, the explicit changes ​are related to            
the revision of the EU policy in the energy dimension. The initial impact ​was made               
28 
 by Gas Directive (2009/73/EC) and Gas Supply Regulation 2010, which declared ​the            
diversification of gas supply. Pursuant to Articles 36 (e) of Gas Directive            
2009/73/EC to ​obtain security of supply by “​the contribution of the infrastructure to             
the diversification of gas supply”, the several EU Member States see a direct breach              
of the legal basis by implementing the project​. They underlined that a new pipeline is               
a threat toward the European energy policy and their national interests such as an              
energy supply and a territorial security.  
Furthermore, the creation of the Energy Union became the crucial strategy of the EU              
energy policy. It aims to provide a well-diversified and competitive gas market            
through ​implementing of the Southern Gas Corridor, ​the development of a liquid gas             
hub in the Mediterranean and promoting its access among the EU Member States             
(European Commission, 2017, November 8). The European Commission insists that          
the particular objectives are incompatible with ​the construction of the pipeline as the             
strategic priorities of ​the Energy Union would not ​be met​. ​The construction of NS2              
would undermine the current functioning of energy market and the EU Member            
States would be more insecure by pumping gas from the one biggest supplier             
(Barnes, 2017). Under these circumstance, the particular changes in the geopolitical           
environment ​is determined as the independent variable in this paper which provoked            
the beginning of​ the process of securitization by the several EU Member States. 
Securitization which composed of ​securitizing movement ​is presented as a dependent           
variable in the research. The energy relations, ​particularly ​NS2 as an example of             
energy relations between Gazprom on behalf of Russia and the Member States of EU              
are the object by which this process will be ​inticates​. To trace the key aspects of this                 
phenomenon, there ​are chosen countries which have the different backgrounds in           
some aspects​, nonetheless, all of them has tried to present ​the the Nord Stream 2               
pipeline as a threat to the national, ​as well as​ the EU, interests.  
Firstly ​and foremost, the difference found in the ​geographical location of the            
Member States. Sweden and Denmark ​are included to the northwestern European           
territory known as Scandinavia, however, Poland and Latvia are the part of Eastern             
Europe. Despite the different location of these Member States, all of them have the              
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 exit to the Baltic sea which explains the reason ​why ​these four EU MS have ​some                
concerns towards building of the new pipeline.  
This geographical location influences also on one more difference known such as ​the             
historical background of states​. During the last 20th century both countries, Poland            
and Latvia ​were tightly connected with ​the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics            
(USSR). After the World War II (WWII), in 1952 Poland ​officially ​claimed ​the             
creation of t​he People's Republic of Poland under imposed ​communist regime​. At the             
meantime, in conformity with ​the Welles Declaration of 1940, Latvia ​was included            
as one republic to USSR. The communist regime with a high level of dependency on               
Russian energy supply ​made two countries similar to each other. Regrading ​Sweden,            
this state took ​the position of non-participant in the WWII and over 40 years the               
government ​was chaired by Social Democratic Party by replacing on ​coalition of            
liberal and right-wing. Denmark was an independent state with a short term of Nazi              
occupation during 1940. After the WWII, the state followed a membership policy by             
being a founding member of the United Nations organization, the North Atlantic            
Treaty Organization, and the European Community. Regarding the political parties,          
the Social Democrats chaired the government until 1972 in Denmark. As a result,             
while Latvia and Poland were under the pressure of a communist regime, Sweden             
and Denmark ​were separated​ from any Russian influence.  
Lastly​, ​the spatial frame of countries’ accession to the European Union is distinct             
among particular countries. Poland and Latvia ​joined ​the EU during the enlargement            
in 2004, in contrast to Denmark and Sweden, which are ​relatively ​“old’ Member             
State (​respectively ​1973 and 1995). This ​fact significantly ​influenced on ​the           
integration of social, economic and security areas. The democracy as an important            
requirement of the EU accession ​was weakened by the communist past in Poland and              
Latvia. ​In reference to the theory of Europeanization (Risse et al., 2001) at the late               
1990 and beginning of 2000s Poland and Latvia had started their way of changes to               
decrease the degree of ​“​misfit” between European-level processes, policies and          
institutions, although Denmark and Sweden were already the powerful Member          
States of the EU.  
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 In turn to the common magnitude, since ​the beginning of the discussion on ​the              
construction of the gas project, the four EU Member States have voiced against its              
implementing. Meanwhile, criticism of the pipeline construction derives ​from         
different motives of the Member States, all of them ​are united by a common aim to                
securitize the gas project. After the Nord Stream 1 project ​was successfully            
completed​, Polish and Latvian authorities had made a public statement of ​the            
importance of ​the security of energy supply of the EU and a threat to this issue which                 
derives from the new proposal of ​the continuation of the pipeline. Besides ​this             
assumptions, Poland also argued against the offshore as its construction does not            
consider the Russian-Ukrainian war. Regarding Sweden and Denmark, ​initially, ​they          
were more unlikely to block the gas pipeline. ​Nevertheless, from 2015 both countries             
have insisted on the assessing this construction by the European Commission to be             
sure in its compliance with the key objectives of the European energy policy             
(​Gotkowska​ and Szymański, 2016).  
The motives of the opposition among these Nordic Member States is a concern about              
the defence issue​, in particular, the use of their territories (Lang and Westphal, 2017).              
As has ​been noted above, the route of the pipeline will ​be located ​in the Baltic Sea at                  
a distance away from countries. Although this distance is sufficient enough from            
Poland and Latvia, the gas offshore would pass via the exclusive economic zones of              
Sweden (500 km), Denmark and the latter’s territorial waters. Thus, the political            
leaders have called attention to their national territories which would ​be challenged            
by exercising of the gas pipeline. ​Whereas states do not ​have a jurisdiction to              
challenge ​the construction of the project based on the Law of the Sea, they referred               
to the European Commission which also has a limited rights under the Gas Directive              
73/2009/EC. Overall, ​all the chosen Member States have own reasons to consider            
NS2 as a threat to ​the security of energy supply and national sovereignty. In the               
empirical part there will ​be analysed how these four states have interpreted it in their               
speech acts. 
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 3.2. Data Collection 
A large part of the analysis will ​be based upon the speech acts of the ​securitizing                
actors which ​are taken from international ​as well as national news agencies,            
respectively EU Observer, Politico, Reuters, The Financial Times, Energy Post, The            
Local etc. In addition, there will ​be provided with ​some ​speeches of politicians from              
the national broadcasting, for instance, Latvian Public Broadcasting (​Lsm.lv​),         
Sweden Radio (Sveriges Radio). To illustrate the background of particular          
utterances, the analysis will use the official reports concerning the gas pipeline,            
where there ​are presented the argumentation of pros and cons of the pipeline,             
accordingly ​issued by Nord Stream 2 AG, Espoo. ​Moreover, the official documents            
of the European Commission such as press releases, directives (​mostly ​Gas Directive            
(2009/73/EC), Gas Regulation (EC) No 994/2010), announcements of the President          
of the European Commission and ​a number of Commissioners will be an integral             
part to maintain the context of the speech acts. ​The opinion of analysts and scientists               
will ​be taking into account to draw a comprehensive background of motives to             
securitize the energy relations ​in the case of NS2. Consequently, the overall data ​are              
justified by the aim to provide a content analysis of speech acts to see how particular                
countries interpret ​the construction of​ the transmission pipeline.  
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 4. Empirical Analysis 
The project Nord Stream 2 reveals on the relations between the Member States of the               
European Union and Russia. In the technical scope, the transmission pipeline, ​as well             
as Nord Stream 1, will comprise two parallel 48 inch lines, which is around 1,200               
km. NS2 will run from Russia, Ust-Luga to the North German coast near Greifswald              
(​see ​Figure 1, Espoo, 2017). The current plan of the gas project would allow Russia               
to bypass Ukraine, Poland and Belarus as the transit routes, which ​in turn ​makes              
Russia more independent in the supplying natural gas than ever before. Gazprom            
would have a possibility to choose the direction in which it could flow gas supply. 
Regarding the environmental issue, scientists have the controversial opinions         
towards the effect of NS2 on the Baltic Region. The experts who worked on Espoo               
Reports underlined that there would not be ‘significant or lasting impacts to the             
Baltic Sea, the onshore environment or local communities’ (Ibid.). ​In general, their            
estimation within the environmental criterion approved the secure and sustainable          
construction of the gas offshore. ​Nevertheless, some European environment         
scientists disprove this statement. The line of criticism ​was devoted by Polish            
experts, who refer to the low level of “reliable impact on fauna and flora” in the                
particular waters (ClientEarth, 2017, June 7). Likewise, Latvian and Danish scientists           
see an imminent danger of natural resources by ​the building of NS2. These             
assumptions towards the gas project ​firmly ​confirm the disagreement within          
environment scope. 
Overall, by being one of the central gas deals for both sides, the EU and Russia, NS2                 
would ensure the secure and reliable gas supply and as a result, would more              
interconnect these two international actors. Still, in the light of the arrangement of             
the second branch of Nord Stream in the Baltic, some Member States of the              
European Union has raised a meaningful amount of questions and contradictions.           
Despite the ​apparent profit from this project, the flexibility of Gazprom’s supply and             
Russian-German partnership invoked the intention discussion with a fear of the EU            
vulnerability in the upcoming future. Therefore, upon the purpose of the research, the             
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 empirical part will analyze the speech acts of the EU politicians to trace ​the              
interpretation of​ NS2 as a threat.  
Figure 1. The route of Nord Stream 2. Source: Gazprom.com. Available at:            
http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/built/nord-stream2/ 
 
4.1. Nord Stream 2 towards a ​securitized​ domain  
After North European Gas Pipeline has flown its first gas supply to the EU MS in                
2011 and 2012, the discussion on Nord Stream 2 became a significant issue within an               
EU level. In the beginning, the proposal of the additional pipeline in the Baltic              
Region had seen as a ​purely ​commercial venture, presented by Gazprom.           
Subsequently​, this non-political issue has ​been shifted to the political scope by the             
EU MS who ​actively ​discussed the gas supplier of this project and its current              
relations with the EU. After the contest on ​the building of NS2 in June 2015, in                
September of the same year, Gazprom and German gas companies signed an            
agreement to construct the Nord Stream 2 pipeline by the end of 2019. Later on, five                
European energy companies such as Uni-per, BASF/Wintershall, OMV, Engie and          
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 Shell had agreed to maintain ​the financing of the pipeline which comprises 50% of              
all projects, meanwhile, the other part of the plan belongs to Gazprom. Since the              
decision to set up the second branch of Nord Stream ​was announced​, the EU MS               
brought to the table this project as a political issue. According to the frame of CS,                
this deal became to appear on the agenda of public debates in the European              
Commission and working parties. Under these circumstances, at that moment NS2           
was handled within the political scope by the bilateral relations between Russia and             
the EU. 
As has ​been mentioned above, the CEE countries, ​specifically ​Poland and Latvia,            
were one of the first actors who ​evaluated all benefits and at the meantime, potential               
threats of the project. Thus, by the end of 2015, the active opposition of NS2 became                
to appear in the national news agencies. Initially​, the main line of criticism ​was              
derived from the goals of Energy Union and then ​was tightly underpinned by the              
concerns of national security. Hence, the securitizing actors have put on the agenda             
contradictions between energy security and offshore gas at the national level. They            
also raised the question on the EU security, both in the energy and political contexts.               
Thus, after 2015 the Member States of the EU ​extensively ​had discussed the gas              
project in ​the context of ​increasing their insecurity. With this intention, it can ​be              
concluded that authorities of the EU MS ​attempt to move the issue in ​the area of                
urgency.  
The shift to this stage can ​be characterised by ​the utterance of MS political leaders               
who claimed the project as the existential threat to the particular referent objects such              
as energy relations and national security. The primary reason which explains why            
this issue ​was framed in the securitized domain is a fear of dependency on Russian               
gas supply. Considering the last years of Russian policy at the international stage, the              
MS cannot see the shared deals with the country against which they imposed             
sanctions. In 2015 the European Commission, chaired by the new President,           
Jean-Claude Juncker, adopted ​the creation of the Energy Union which was one of the              
flagship initiatives of the current College. On the agenda of the EU energy policy, it               
was put the future diversification of energy supplier, the high level of supply security              
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 and less dependency on energy imports (European Commission, 2017, September          
17). According to these aims, Nord Stream 2 has looked a less attractive project              
among the EU Member States. Although, Germany and its well-known friends such            
as Austria, France, the UK and Netherland supported at one the gas project, the CEE               
countries and some Nordic countries, Sweden and Denmark, outset a discontent           
about the gas pipeline. The statement that NS2 would jeopardise the European            
energy market became the critical pitfall ​in the discussion of​ its implementation. 
In general, from ​the beginning of the public debate, the active opponents of NS2              
were Poland and Latvia. Afterwards, Denmark and Sweden made the official           
announcements which declared the strong opposition to strained the future energy           
relations with Russia. These debates and criticism are the first stage of the process of               
securitization, which ​is known as the securitizing movement. Up to the present, the             
gas project remains on this level since there is no evidence of the successful              
securitization. The situation seems like the debate is still ongoing, the extraordinary            
measures by the European Commission are in the process of discussion, and the             
speech acts of the securitizing actors try to continue to persuade the audience in the               
danger of the future gas offshore. 
 
4.2. Speech acts of the securitizing​ actors 
4.2.1. Poland  
The geopolitical and historical dimension had made Poland ​mostly ​dependent on           
Russian gas supply. During the last century, Poland had ​mainly ​got a gas supply              
from Russia through Orenburg and Yamburg pipelines. After the collapse of USSR,            
already in 1997, Poland has become a transit territory of Yamal pipeline, which             
provides a natural gas from Serbia to Germany. The permanent dependence on            
Russian gas supply ​formulated the primary goal of Polish energy policy - to diversify              
gas suppliers (Wojcieszak, 2017: 87). In 2006, the state also supported the NATO             
proposal of solidarity between countries​, in turn, to help each other when the gas              
supply is in danger. Nowadays Poland adheres two directions of its policy such as              
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 the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and ​the idea of ​building the pipeline with Norway              
for receiving gas resources. As follows, in 2016, Poland opened its first LNG             
terminal at the Baltic Sea port of Swinoujscie and in June 2017 Poland signed with               
Denmark a memorandum to ensure the gas supply from the North Sea to Poland. ​For               
that reasons, it can ​be considered that Poland figured out the clear alternatives of              
NS2 to follow own energy priorities. 
Taking into account aforementioned Polish situation, there is a risk to lose the status              
of a transit country as Yamal gas pipeline would decrease its delivery of natural gas               
to the EU. Secondly​, Poland would become ​highly ​dependent on German gas supply             
which ​initially ​is Russian. Importantly​, the Ukrainian crisis in which Poland blames            
the Russian involvement seems to be one more reason for Polish discontent. These             
assumptions became the primary catalysers of the Polish government to raise the            
question of the potential threats that would derive from ​the implementation of the gas              
project. The political leaders of the country were the first one active opponents of the               
project to make its polisition clear for the European community and Russia.  
Since the countries ​officially ​agreed on ​the construction of NS2 in 2015, the Polish              
authority has put on the agenda this gas project as a threat to energy supply and                
political objectives of the EU. In April 2016, the former Prime Minister of Poland              
and current Chair of the Industry Committee of the European Parliament, Jerzy            
Buzek, came out with a conclusion that “Nord Stream 2 and Energy Union cannot              
co-exist” (Beckman, 2016, April 14). ​In essence, his statement underlines ​the           
discrepancy of the core objectives of the Energy Union with the gas pipeline. As set               
out in 2015, the Energy Union Package has to ensure the MS in the affordable,               
secure supplies which at the same time will help the EU to meet the Framework for                
Climate and Energy. These principles derive from the critical aim of the EU policy to               
increase ​the diversification of energy sector by finding new sources. While the            
ongoing project has the same supplier such as Russia, the Polish politician stressed             
this would not ​be compiled with the goal of Energy Union such as diversification of               
gas supply. 
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 Furthermore, in October 2016, the Polish Minister for European Affairs, Konrad           
Szymanski, wrote the opinion article for the Financial Times, where declared that: 
 
“Together with eight other EU member states (the Czech Republic, Estonia,           
Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia), and with the          
tacit support of ​a couple of others, Poland has opposed Nord Stream 2 since              
Gazprom first announced it in 2015. It undermines European solidarity and the            
Energy Union, the EU’s flagship project.” ​(Szymanski, 2016, October 21)​. 
 
This official announcement is an explicit rejection of Poland to set up NS2. Once              
again his claim refers to the Energy Union, which objectives are not compatible with              
the construction of NS2. Konrad Szymanski underlines the legal base which should            
be adhered by adopting to construct the gas offshore by all MS. Another referent              
object of securitization reveals on European solidarity and unity in his utterance. The             
gas pipeline will instead divide the MS than secure energy supply to the EU. ​As well                
as in that article the Polish Minister for European Affairs compared this project with              
“a Trojan horse capable of destabilising the economy and poisoning political           
relations inside the EU” (Ibid.). From here, NS2 ​is portrayed as a distraction within              
an EU-level in terms it might generate mistrust among the Member States. The             
Polish politician thus brought out with a conclusion that pipeline takes the form of              
internal threat which at first glance has ​merely ​a significant economic and energy             
benefits ​whereas it hides a potential security problem toward the European unity.            
Despite the mentioned above utterance, a particular expression towards the gas           
project focuses on fear of political tensions between European countries. 
The line of the criticism of NS2 has ​been followed by the current Polish Prime               
Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki. He refers to the principle of diversification which           
should ​be followed in all projects of energy supply, and NS2 cannot be the exception               
of rules. In February 2018, the Prime Minister stressed that: 
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 “Nord Stream 2 violates the principle of diversification that underpins in the            
EU's energy security…. That is why we [Poland] conduct active activities ​as            
well as support the activities of European institutions aimed to block ​the            
construction of​ NS2”  (Gazownictwo, 2018, February 21). 1
 
With attention to the energy policy concerns, the Prime Minister also emphasises            
how the principle of diversification will ​be kept to take the extraordinary measure             
such as blocking of the pipeline. Substantially​, the solution should derive not only             
from the initiatives of Member States but also should it involve the EU institutions to               
the extent to which they can act based the principle of shared competence according              
to Art. 4 of TFEU (TFEU, 2008, Art 4). Still, as has ​been mentioned above, the                
European Commission does not have a mandate to negotiate over Nord Stream 2 as it               
is the Intergovernmental Agreement and the proposal to amend Gas Directive           
73/2009/EC might ​be seen as the first step to handle this issue by the Commission.               
Furthermore, by the end of his speech act, he underlines that this project not only               
might challenge one of the preliminary objectives of the Energy Union,           
diversification, but it also contradicts the current Brussels political stance on           
Ukrainian conflict. A further using of Baltic Sea would change the status of Ukraine              
as a transit zone, “Russia can escalate the conflict in any way​, attack the entire               
country” (Gazownictwo, 2018, February 21). Thus, in one speech act, NS2 ​is            2
simultaneously presented as a threat towards two referent objects, securitization of           
energy supply and the objectives of EU foreign policy. 
Polish Prime Minister also ​tightly ​ties the political environment of the EU with the              
energy issue and NS2. During the visit by U.S. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson,              
1 ​Original version: “Nord Stream 2 narusza zasadę dywersyfikacji, która leży u podstaw 
bezpieczeństwa energetycznego UE….Dlatego prowadzimy aktywne działania, jak i 
wspieramy działania instytucji europejskich, mające na celu zablokowanie budowy Nord 
Stream 2”. Author's own translation from the original in Polish language. Available at: 
http://gazownictwo.wnp.pl/mateusz-morawiecki-nord-stream-2-narusza-zasade-dywersyfika
cji,317949_1_0_0.htm​l 
2 Original version​: ”…..Rosja może w dowolny sposób eskalować konflikt, zaatakować cały 
kraj.”​ ​Author's own translation from the original in Polish language. Available at: 
http://gazownictwo.wnp.pl/mateusz-morawiecki-nord-stream-2-narusza-zasade-dywersyfika
cji,317949_1_0_0.htm​l 
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 Mateusz Morawiecki had announced that an extraordinary measure should ​be          
implemented through ​the jurisdiction of US, “we [Poland] want ​the construction of            
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to fall under the US sanctions bill…which includes,             
among others, sanctions against Russia” (Reuters.com, 2018, January 29). To          
analyze this statement, it should ​be taken into account an external dimension of the              
EU policy. As the Polish authority understands the complexity of discussion on the             
transmission pipeline in Brussels, it ​started to ask help the external actors such as the               
US. ​In general, the US supports the Polish opposition and accepts the argument that              
NS2 can be a severe threat to the EU energy security. ​Nonetheless, up to now, there                
is ​not any evidence of acts neither attempts by the US towards halting of ​the               
construction of​ the gas project. 
A month before, in January 2018, there ​was held the discussion between Polish and              
Swedish governments about the alternative Polish option such as Baltic Pipe. In the             
interview for Polish newspaper "Dziennika Gazety Prawnej", Mateusz Morawiecki         
noticed that proposed pipeline is an important gas project which should ​be            
implemented in the nearest future “... we want real activities to start with this              
strategic investment of infrastructure [Baltic Pipe] as soon as possible”         3
(Gazownictwo, 2018, January 29). ​Mainly​, the project should provide Norwegian          
delivery gas to Poland via Denmark. Mateusz Morawiecki concludes that this           
pipeline for Poland ​does not have any significant challenges which would not            
threaten the political and energy aspects at the internal and external stages in             
comparison with NS2. Thus, following the principle of diversification, the Baltic           
Pipe would avoid the monopoly of Russian gas on the Polish energy market and              
make it less vulnerable in relations toward Germany. For the state, this proposal is an               
alternative to the second branch of Nord Stream and can ​be seen as a rational               
decision to prevent the potential threats. 
3 ​Original version: “Zależy nam, aby jak najszybciej rozpoczęły się realne działania 
związane z tą strategiczną dla nas inwestycją infrastrukturalną". Author's own translation 
from the original in Polish language. ​Available at: 
http://gazownictwo.wnp.pl/mateusz-morawiecki-nord-stream-2-jest-niebezpieczny,316256_1
_0_0.html [Accessed 12 March 2018]  
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 In general, the speech acts of the most potent part of Polish authorities such as               
former and current Polish Prime Minister, Polish Minister for European Affairs are            
the official announcements which have made and continue to make specific steps            
towards the process of securitization. The referent objects cover ​some ​issues such as             
European unity, the supply of energy, political objectives of foreign policy and            
environment. As all of them have a different context of expression, the critical             
concern of the Polish authority remains the same,  to cancel the building NS2. 
4.2.2. Latvia 
Being a former state of the Soviet bloc​, by and large, Russia has been a significant                
supplier of energy for Latvia. The Joint Stock Company “Latvijas Gaze” had been             
over 20 years a leading regulator of gas supply in Latvia, owned by companies such               
as Russian Gazprom and European Marguerite Fund and Uniper Ruhrgas          
International. Still, since December 1, 2017, Gaso, emerged from the initiative of            
“Latvijas Gaze”, has had the licence to distribute the tariffs of natural gas. These two               
companies operate on Russian natural gas, which makes Latvia ​entirely ​dependent on            
Russia at least until 2030. ​For that reasons, the current energy policy of Latvia              
focuses on other possibilities to diversify the energy supply. The first LNG terminal             
in Klaipėda, in Lithuania, is an option for Latvia to achieve its objectives. Although              
in August 2017 Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia could not ​reach an agreement on joint              
LNG market (Baltictimes.com, 2017, August 31). 
It may ​be considered that Latvia like Poland has the same concerns of the energy               
policy which induce against ​the construction of NS2. Since the beginning of the             
discussion on the future development of the gas project, the Latvian politicians have             
raised an issue about ​the involvement of the northwestern port of Ventspils and its              
two terminals, Noord Natie and Eurohome Latvija. The state would benefit EUR 25             
million in total by involving ​in the construction of NS2 (Baltictimes.com, 2017,            
April 23). ​Nonetheless, Latvian authority opposed the financial offer by the           
consideration that pipeline is a part of geopolitical dimension rather than an            
economic issue with a high profit. At first, at the end of 2015, Latvian officials have                
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 made the public announcements against the future gas project. In particular, the            
former Latvian Prime Minister, Laimdota Straujuma, identified the specific obstacles          
which would ​be appeared ​in the construction of NS2. In her speech act, she brought               
out with a conclusion that continuation and support of the most significant energy             
supplier, Russia, is not a logical choice to stand with the primary targets of the EU                
energy policy. Laimdota Straujuma declared that “Europe should be more consistent           
in its wish to become energy independent from Russia” (EurAsiaDaily.com, 2015,           
November 2). The statement reveals the lack of rationality and the central line of              
Brussels’ decisions in ​the context of ​the events when the European Commission            
presented the objectives of the Energy Union. Hence, from this perspective, gas            
supply from Russia cannot ​be outlined in one frame with the EU energy policy,              
notably ​its directives and proposals.  
A same line of criticism ​is traced ​in the utterance of Minister of Finance, Dana               
Reizniece-Ozlo, in 2015. The underlying message is also about ​the incompatibility of            
the EU policy with the gas offshore, “With the right hand we are writing an energy                
strategy, while with the left one we are building Nord Stream 2” (Ibid.). As she               
noticed, her audience is the European politicians, who should consider the primary            
aims of the European energy policy when they will give consent to implement NS2.              
The speech act does not have an explicit expression in a term of threat, although the                
Minister of Finance mentioned the referent object such as the energy strategy which             
can ​be damaged by the construction NS2. As a result, the obstacles of the EU policy                
should ​be solved by the MS within overcoming the fundamental contradictions, one            
of which is the gas offshore.  
The Latvian politician and Member of the European Parliament since 2009, Krisjanis            
Karins, has underlined the potential threats at the national level by ​the involvement             
of Latvian port in this gas deal. As has ​been mentioned before, NS2 can ​be seen as                 
resources of profit for Latvian companies. ​At the same time, MEP underlines its             
temporary asset which would ​be paid by ​the security of supply for Latvia and the EU                
(Ibid.). In his speeches, the main line of criticism refers to the contradictions between              
the pipeline with goals of the Energy Union, “The project does not fit Europe’s              
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 Energy Union’s goals and principles agreed upon by EU member states” (BNN.com,            
2018, February 1). ​As well as Polish authorities, Latvian MEP highlighted the direct             
influence of the second branch of Nord Stream on the future escalation of Ukrainian              
war. With this in mind, the referent objects which might ​be threatened by NS2 are               
the objectives of EU energy policy and foreign affairs in Brussels, including the             
conflict in Ukraine and sanctions. 
Besides MEP, one of the Latvian authorities is the current Foreign Minister, Edgars             
Rinkevics, who also can ​be considered as a securitizing actor. He has ​repeatedly             
emphasised in his speeches that NS2 is a threat towards the unity and solidarity of               
the Baltic Region. The Foreign Minister considers the Latvian involvement          
incompatible in relations to the Baltic neighbours as it would generate an aggravation             
among them. In April 2017 Erdgas Rinkevics stressed about this concern and other             
inevitable consequences of the gas project  by declaring:  
 
“Latvian permission to use its territory would cause a split among partners in              
the region and would threaten these joint projects and Latvia's credibility in its             
foreign policy efforts within NATO and the EU. Latvia and the other Baltic             
countries have constantly emphasised the Nord Stream project's inconsistency         
with EU energy policy principles, as well as the threat this project poses to the               
EU as a whole…” ​(Baltictimes.com, 2017, April 23). 
 
The context of his utterance also refers to the EU energy policy and its particular               
objectives. As outlined earlier by other securitizing actors, the weakness of pipeline            
lies in its major shareholder, Russian Gazprom, which might not ensure future            
diversification of energy supply to the EU Member States. He calls ​the construction             
of the pipeline as a “geopolitical project” which ​is presented more in the political              
scope rather than in economic dimension (Lsm.lv, 2017, June 30). Apart from this,             
Latvian Foreign Minister mentioned about the environment concern which is ​usually           
not at the top of agenda. ​In general, the environmental assessment of NS2 ​was              
published by Russia in 2017, which stated that it would ​take into account the aim of                
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 carbon dioxide emission reductions. However, as highlighted before, the European          
scientists have an opposite opinion, standing ​tightly ​with the objectives of Paris            
Agreement like the 5-year ambition cycle aimed to reduce green gas emissions.            
According to ​the opinion of Erdgas Rinkevics, he sees the negative effect of NS2 on               
the environmental dimension of EU policy by saying, “And ​lastly ​we have to look at               
environmental risk. No matter how sophisticated the technologies, this too has to ​be             
looked at with all due seriousness” ​(Ibid.). The referent object is an impact on an               
environment that might ​be threatened by implementing of NS2. ​For this reason, the             
Latvian Prime Minister underlined several damaged issues which ​directly ​move the           
gas project from the political to a securitized scope in his speeches.  
As has ​been shown​, Latvia has ​mainly ​the same stance of referent objects on ​the               
building of pipeline ​as well as Poland. Firstly​, Latvian politicians expressed a fear             
towards the objectives of the EU energy policy which can ​be threatened by NS2.              
Furthermore, the division among the MS can ​be seen as a big challenge for Brussels.               
Under these circumstances, the division means ​the formulation of two blocks such as             
the active supporters who perceive NS2 as a commercial project with high profit and              
the opponents who see this project as an existential threat towards various referent             
objects. Besides, securitizing actors conclude that NS2 contradicts the foreign policy           
of Brussels as it would change the priorities in ​the context of ​Ukrainian war. As a                
whole, since Latvian authority does not resist ​the fact ​that its companies can profit              
from their direct involvement in the project, it does not predict a meaningful ​benefit              
from this deal. ​On the contrary, it may have the inevitable negative consequences for              
the state, Baltic Region, and the EU.  
4.2.3. Denmark  
Denmark became the first Nordic country who had joined the European Community            
after a public referendum in 1972. The population voted by 63.3% in favour to              
become the part of the EC. Since 1 January 1973, Denmark has ​officially ​been an               
active member of the European Union. ​Located in the Northern part of Europe, the              
country ​does not have any boundaries with Russia in comparison with Latvia or even              
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 Poland which is close enough to Russian territory. Regarding the gas situation in             
Denmark, despite Poland and Latvia, the country is self-sufficient and independent           
enough from imported gas. It is the only one MS in the EU which is a net exporter of                   
natural gas to other countries (Energinet, 2017: 5). Since 1987, the Tyra platforma,             
located ​in the North Sea, is the primary resource from which the gas ​is provided to                
Danish consumers. Danish Underground Consortium owns this large condensate         
field and yet, operated by Danish oil and gas company, Maersk Oil. However, the              
question related to ​the security of gas supply in Denmark has ​been raised in 2017               
when ​was adopted decision to make the reconstruction of Tyra in the period             
2019-2020. This arrangement​, in turn, will temporary shut-down the supply of           
natural gas to Denmark ​as well as Sweden. Under these circumstances, the solution             
was found in ​the way that gas will ​be provided from German and Danish gas storage                
facilities.  
Derived from facts mentioned above, it can ​be considered that Denmark stands in a              
completely ​different position towards the gas supply unlike Poland and Latvia, where            
the supplier remains Russia. ​Nonetheless, Danish authority has also put the efforts to             
cancel ​the building of NS2. First, it ​is provoked by the route of the pipeline which                
would run via 139 km of Danish territorial water ​as well as it was in case of the Nord                   
Stream 1 project. Secondly​, being the active proponents to keep sanctions on Russia,             
Danish authority sees the sharp contradictions between Brussels’ policy and the           
ongoing project  (Herszenhorn, 2017, July 2). 
The first official speech acts of Danish officials concerning NS2 ​was given in late              
2016, where the government raised a question about the route of the pipeline. Up to               
that time, the Danish position ​was mainly relied on ​the jurisdiction of the European              
institutions to decide whether the transmission pipeline has a place ​in the future ​of              
the European Union. In February 2017, Danish Foreign Minister, Anders Samuelsen,           
answering on the question about the Danish stance on NS2, stated that: ​“This is not a                
question only for Denmark but for the European Union.” (Carbonnel, Eckert, 2017,            
March 24). ​Moreover, during the summit of EU leaders in March 2017, Danish             
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 Minister also presented NS2 as a case about the responsibility of EU institutions             
rather than a challenge of separate countries, ​notably ​Denmark (Ibid.). 
The controversial nature of gas offshore from the Danish side ​was underlined by the              
former Prime Minister of Denmark and ex-Secretary General of NATO, Anders           
Fogh Rasmussen. He brought out with the statement, “Denmark is ​completely ​right            
to have concerns about Nord Stream 2, a Russian political project, a danger to              
European security, and a reversal of all the EU'​s good work on energy security”              
(Rettman, 2017, December 1). In fact, “a Russian political project” pays attention to             
the crucial role of Russia to implement this project. ​In other words, it is an ​evident                
for Danish politicians that an initiative to construct the second branch of North gas              
pipeline sets out ​mainly ​from the Russian political environment. Likewise, he           
emphasised the importance to make a thoughtful decision as it ​is tightly connected             
with the EU security in the energy context. Thus, the energy security as a referent               
object means the instability of significant supplier, Russia, which can not ​be            
considered as a reliable strategic partner in the current situation. ​Furthermore, a line             
of the opposition to the building NS2 ​is led by the Social Democratic party whose               
members ​repeatedly ​declared that the pipeline is not an issue of the European neither              
Danish policies. Nick Hækkerup, a member of the Danish Parliament and spokesman            
of Foreign Affairs, explained the core arguments of criticism by declaring: 
 
“...​in a situation where the Russians are acting ​aggressively ​and where Danish            
soldiers are about to ​be stationed in the Baltic countries ​in order ​to balance              
the situation, then ​of course ​we have to weigh in how it [Nord Stream 2] fits                
our foreign policy interests.” ​(Kirk, Rettman, 2017, October 11).  
 
In this case​, looking at the recent political situation which draws Russia as an              
aggressor towards Ukraine, NS2 is out of the EU scope. The comment illustrates that              
it is impossible to see the compatibility between ​the implementation of NS2 and the              
principal goals of the EU, one of which sets out to ensure the future security in the                 
Baltic region. Hence, ​the conclusion of this speech act follows the assumption that             
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 Brussels have to account for all actions and goals to avoid the EU policy divergence.               
The referent object of this speech, thus, is the objectives of Danish foreign policy              
interests that would ​be threatened by the decision to construct the second branch of              
Nord Stream. 
Following a turn of events over the past year, in April 2017, Nord Stream 2 AG had                 
applied for permission in Denmark, and since that time the Danish Energy Agency             
has been responsible for assessing the impact of NS2 on behalf of the Danish State.               
In general, until October 2017, the core criteria which ​was taken into account was              
merely ​an environmental impact. ​In turn, it was clear that only the threat to the               
environment can be a reason for rejection to set NS2. Based on that situation, the               
Minister of Energy, Utilities and Climate, Lars Christian Lilleholt, ​repeatedly          
underlined that the reason ​why ​Denmark ​does not have any legislation tool to decline              
NS2. She claimed ​that ​“Denmark ​is currently unable to involve foreign policy,            
defence policy and security policy aspects when dealing with applications for           
pipelines…” (Ibid.). ​Nonetheless, the turning point of the Danish ​decision ​about           
Nord Stream 2 became the discussion to pass a new law, which brings to the               
forefront a detailed evaluation of the pipeline also on the ground of foreign, security              
and defence policies. ​In a sense, the legal basis for this decision is the ‘United               
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (UNCLOS) under Article 79 (para 4),              
which ​constitutes that “Nothing in this Part affects the right of the coastal State to               
establish conditions for cables or pipelines entering its territory or territorial sea”            
(UN General Assembly, 1982). Consequently, whereas Lars Christian Lilleholt did          
not come up with the final decision, this new legislative amendment includes in its              
scope NS2 which had ​been submitted​ before. 
It should ​be added that the Danish Minister called attention to the sting of events               
which ​dramatically ​changed over the past years and has a negative impact on the              
bilateral relations between Russia and the EU. Her utterance derives from the            
assumption about the current political situations which cannot lead to the stable ties             
between two international actors. ​Moreover, after the decision to adopt the new law,             
the Minister had also specified ​the jurisdiction of Danish authority to change the             
47 
 approach of assessing ​the construction of the pipeline. ​In other words, nowadays            
there is a legal frame which takes into the consideration the security aspects of              
Denmark concerning construct NS2.  This ​is followed​ by: 
 
“Political conditions in the world also change. And I ​am very pleased that the              
parliament and government now ​have the opportunity to ​involve security,          
defence and foreign policy aspects when dealing with such an application.”           
(Kirk, Rettman, 2017, October 11). 
 
All in all, the rhetoric among the Danish politicians about the new gas pipeline has               
been actively discussed over the last year. After the much-debated question, the            
government had adopted a law towards the territorial water, which entered ​into ​force             
on January 1, 2018. It can ​be considered as a direct act of Danish policy to ban ​the                  
building of NS2 via 139 km of its territorial water. To conclude, in the speech acts of                 
Danish authorities the referent objects are the EU foreign policy interests, that should             
be protected and taken into account during ​the negotiation of this deal. Secondly​, as              
it is difficult to trace the explicit expression of national interests as a threat in the                
speech acts, the extraordinary measures such as an implementing of a new law gave              
evidence. To a large extent, Denmark ​is alarmed by the future Russian intervention             
in its territorial water as it is a question of security concerns which is an essential                
priority in Danish policy.  
4.2.4. Sweden 
The history of Swedish membership in the EU started in January 1995, when the              
country ​officially ​joined Europe. In fact, after four years of negotiations and public             
voting in 1994, the Nordic countries became even a more meaningful part of the EU               
policy. Drawing upon the historical background, Sweden, ​as well as Denmark, had            
none any substantial connection with Russia contrary to Poland and Latvia. The            
benchmarks of the last century show that neutrality and principal of           
non-participations in any blocs were the fundamental concerns of Sweden during the            
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 WWII and afterwards. Thus, it brings to the conclusion that Russia did not affect              
Sweden in any way​. Apart from this fact​, analysing the Swedish gas market over the               
last decade, ​the consumption of natural gas in Sweden had ​rapidly ​decreased, and up              
to now, the Swedish energy ​is composed only 3.5% of natural gas. ​Furthermore, the              
current direction of Swedish energy policy ​is mainly concentrated on the renewable            
energy. The gas to Sweden flows running from the North Sea off the coast of               
Denmark and Germany, at large, via Danish territory. As a result, Denmark is a              
primary Swedish partner of the natural gas. Currently, the energy policy of two             
countries put their efforts on the further harmonisation of national gas operators:            
Swedegas and Energinet have to ensure ​the security of gas supply and balance their              
gas markets (Swedegas.com, 2017, September 5). Besides ​the cooperation with          
Denmark, Sweden also has one gas storage facility that ​is operated by Swedegas in              
Skallen. ​In general, both countries ​are tightly connected concerning the gas flow            
which ​is provoked​ by their geographical locations. 
Nonetheless, despite the fact that the country ​is less vulnerable to gas supply and the               
environmental criteria is the only one question in the adopting this ​particular ​gas             
project, in the last two years, there ​was expressed a meaningful amount of criticism              
towards NS2. Principally​, the concerns of Swedish authorities derive from the           
concern to ensure ​the security of national territory rather than the goals of energy              
policy. In substance, the projected pipeline would run in parallel to Nord Stream 1              
via Swedish strategic island, Gotland and port of Karlshamn. ​For this reason, it will              
be a big business deal as Karlshamn will earn around $11.3 million (Carbonnel,             
Eckert, 2017, March 24). ​Thereby, after it ​was announced that Gazprom agreed with             
European companies to construct the pipeline in 2015, the Swedish authorities           
started to express​ potential obstacle for its implementation. 
In September 2016 the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation of Sweden received a             
request concerning ​the permission of ​the building of the gas pipeline. As a             
consequence​, the Swedish authority has raised the question of gas project and its             
future at the level of political debates. The distinguishing feature of the Swedish             
discussion is the multidimensional environment regarding the local authorities,         
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 specifically ​the Municipality of Gotland, and Karlshamn and central government.          
One of the first officials in Sweden who provided the speech act with criticism on               
NS2 was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Margot Wallström. ​Whereas in the political             
system of Sweden a municipality may decide whether ​or not ​to permit to use their               
territories, the Minister, on behalf of the government, pointed out that the pipeline is              
a threat to the national defence policy in that current situation: 
 
“The government can’t control decisions that fall within municipal         
self-government. The municipalities decide on renting ports. The government         
sees the use of the ports as affecting Swedish defence policy interests            
negatively, though our overall assessment is that the project is difficult to            
stop.” ​(Thelocal.se, 2016, December 14) 
 
Nonetheless, she also made a clear point that despite the government’s opinion and             
its concern of defence policy, the Swedish authority had none jurisdiction to stop ​the              
construction of the gas project. Thus, the existential threat such as ​the building of              
NS2  
Under those circumstances, Hans Wallmark, the spokesperson of the defence policy           
from the right-centre opposition, identified the reluctance and weakness of the           
Swedish government in the light of adopting a decision towards NS2, “I [Hans             
Wallmark] think it has ​been handled ​worryingly badly​. This could have ​been done             
several months ago. I think the government is dragging its feet...” (Ibid.). Given this              
point, the government requires more power to ensure the security at the national level              
despite the regional authorities for whom the economic profits ​usually ​prevail.           
Therefore, the discussion on ​the implementation of the gas project and its threat has              
raised one more question on ​the division of power between the government and             
region power. 
With this intention, the Minister of Defence, Peter Hultqvist underlined the Swedish            
defence concerns which could ​be threatened in case Sweden will permit to use             
Swedish islands as a base ​for the construction of NS2. Accordingly, to his speech,              
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 “The use of the ports would affect Swedish defence interests in a negative way, and               
we have informed the municipalities about that…” (Reuters.com, 2016, December          
13). It also said about the importance to notify the local authorities about the              
potential threat when they will give the green light on ​the implementation of the gas               
offshore. ​In other words, the Swedish Minister stressed that ​the security of state             
which is ​usually ​the primary concern at the national level, cannot be out ​the scope of                
municipal control. 
Regarding the authorities in Gotland, the chairman of the Council Committee,           
Tommy Gardell, replied to ​the position of the Minister of Defence by declarin​g             
“We​'re going to say no to leasing the port to Nord Stream” (Thelocal.se, 2016,              
December 16). This utterance made up the national defence of great interest to             
Swedish policy which should ​be taken into account without prejudice. It can ​be seen              
that the municipality put the national security above the local profit, which ​partly             
underlines the power of central government under these circumstances. As a result, it             
rejected the offer of Nord Stream 2 AG to use its territory and lost a chance to earn                  
from the project.  
However, despite ​the opposition of Gotland’s authority, it did not change the            
upcoming events which happened in ​the context of ​Karlshamn Municipality. On           
January 30th, 2017 Radio Sweden made a report in which stated that Swedish             
government found ​the meaning with municipalities and do not see the obstacles to             
concentrate a part of the pipeline’s construction on the Swedish port           
(SverigesRadio.com, 2017, January 30). The Foreign Minister estimated this         
decision as the consensus, which ​was reached by both sides: “If Karlshamn ​chooses             
to proceed this will not threaten defence policy interests...[municipalities] have been           
receptive to the information they have received from the government.” (Reuters.com,           
2017, January 30). As follows, the port of Karlshamn ​is involved in the gas project               
despite all criticism of government towards NS2. ​By and large, this decision derives             
from the specific internal structure of Sweden within the municipal units. 
On the whole a clear division of the government and municipalities, contradictions            
between regional powers show that a threat has to a great extent a biased nature and                
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 it ​is not recognised by the authorities at all levels in Sweden. In fact, the Swedish                
authorities determined the referent object as a defence concern which is the core             
issue of foreign policy. ​On the contrary, Poland​, Latvia, Denmark also mentioned the             
European energy policy as a ​potentially ​threatened point. Mostly​, up to the present             
time, despite ​the decision of Karlshamn Municipality, the Swedish politicians, ​as           
well as Danish, has relied on ​the jurisdiction of the European Commission to block              
the pipeline. 
4.3. Functional actors 
Whereas the primary role of functional actors is to influence the dynamic of             
securitization, Russia can ​be considered as a significant functional actor in the            
particular case study. The immense steps of the functional actor can ​be traced from              
the beginning of the proposal to implement the gas project. Since 2012 an initiative              
to double the capacity of Nord Stream by building two more stings ​was actively put               
on the agenda of debates by CEO of Gazprom. Consequently, the proposal on behalf              
of Russia turned on the official decision in 2015 during the negotiations between the              
European companies and Gazprom during the Business Forum in Vladivostok. 
One of the primary reason ​why ​Russia tries to win the support ​for the              
implementation of this project is its dependence on the European energy market. It             
can ​be explained by the EU-Russia relationship ​which ​is to the great extent             
interdependent regarding consumer-deliver in the energy domain. Albeit the Russian          
economy is ​mostly ​depending on the exports of crude oil than natural gas, the              
income of latter plays a crucial role in the industrial development in Eastern part of               
Russia (Goldthau, 2016: 16). Up to the present time, Russia delivers natural gas to              
Europe through four ways routes (Figure 2) as Yamal pipeline (Belarus, Poland),            
Nord Stream 1 (the Baltic Sea), Blue Stream (the Black Sea and Turkey) and              
Urengoy-Uzhgorod (Ukraine). This what puts Russia on ​the position of high           
dependency on the transit countries which can ​be decreased by ​the implementation of             
NS2. Thus, the ongoing project seems like a valuable tool to diversify the routes of               
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 gas delivering to the EU ​which means that Russia will become even less vulnerable              
from the transit countries. 
 
Figure 2. Pipelines for Russian gas in Europe. Source: Center for the European Reform.              
Available at: https://www.cer.eu/insights/nord-stream-2-more-hot-air-gas  
 
Moreover, the future pipeline would ensure ​the dominance of Gazprom in the            
European gas market. As nowadays the EU uses one-third of gas imports from             
Russia, the pipeline will bind up the EU with Russia as tight as it is ​possible ​in the                  
current situation. It might ​mainly ​mean that ​the position of Russia as a major supplier               
of the EU Member States will be inevitable in the upcoming years. Thus, the Russian               
strategy towards natural gas includes ​the construction of NS2 as a project that             
arguably ​can gain its two primary aims such diversification of export efforts and             
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 ensure the dominance in the European gas market. Drawing on these benefits, Russia             
makes an efforts to influence the public discussion on NS2 and to prove its              
advantages. While at stake there lie the future relations with EU and a significant              
income for Gazprom, there ​are issued a meaningful amount of reports which stresses             
the high importance of the gas pipeline for the EU ​as well as for Russia. During the                 
official meeting and giving the interviews Gazprom on behalf of Russia ​attempts to             
convince the EU institution and the Member States that ​the implementation of Nord             
Stream 2 will ensure the security supply and double the capacity of gas supply to               
Europe. From this perspective, it can ​be seen that Russia is a reliable partner for the                
EU and the project is not more than ​merely ​a commercial venture. 
In this manner, Alexey Miller, the deputy chairman of the Gazprom, expressed his             
confidence of ​the implementation of the ongoing project. He pointed out that “A             
special regime for the Nord Stream 2 project is ​of course ​unnecessary. Nord Stream              
2, as far as technical concepts ​are concerned​, is the same as Nord Stream 1. It will go                  
along the same corridor.” (KyivPost, 2017, June 30). It can ​be considered that             
Gazprom’s chief ​does not see any contradictions concerning NS2 as has the same             
characteristics as NS1. In fact, two new strings of gas offshore will ​be run in parallel                
to NS1 and, thus, the running of the pipeline cannot ​be blocked by the technical               
reasons. ​Furthermore, Alexey Miller has admitted this deal as a ​quite ​good business             
deal for the EU, not only for Russia in terms, it will ensure gas supply for an                 
extended period (Financial Times, 2016, June 16). On the whole, his speech acts             
might ​give an expression that ​the construction of NS2 is in the process and there is                
no a solid background to block it. 
Similarly​, Alexander Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of the Management         
Committee in Gazprom underlined the overstated assumption about NS2 as a threat.            
He ​made it clear that the criticism of the EU Member States ​does not have any                
substantial evidence and “the risks for Nord Stream 2 are hypothetical” (Farchy,            
2018). ​Moreover, as ​it has been noted before, in the Environmental Impact            
Assessment, it ​is declared that the pipeline cannot ​be blocked by its ​potentially             
damaging impact on flora and fauna in the particular region. Because of it will not               
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 dramatically ​affect the environment in the Baltic Sea (Nord Stream 2 AG, 2017). As              
a proof, the scientists ​came to the conclusion that the usage of the same technologies               
as in case of Nord Stream will ensure ​the protection of nature and will have a                
minimal impact on the environment. Therefore, the chairman of Gazprom and the            
official reports ​constitute their statements with ​apparent confidence that the offshore           
pipeline will be in service ​without any​ postponed deadline, at the end of 2019. 
As a matter of fact, Russian authority declares that allowing NS2 to ​be processed              
will not impede the competition in the EU energy market. Vice verse the project will               
increase a competitive situation between Russian export and the LNG on an equal             
footing. Consequently, in media coverage its position focus on ​merely ​the           
commercial benefits of the gas project, ​whereas to avoid any discussion politically​.            
In the Russian news agencies, NS2 appears as a business deal with a significant              
future income ​without any detrimental effects. In February 2018, Sergei Lavrov, the            
Foreign Minister of Russia, has emphasised that it might ​be seen the ​exclusively             
commercial, beneficial aspect of this project (Shcherbak, 2018). As a result, Russian            
political leaders together with Gazprom’s main present this project ​particularly ​in the            
economic dimension beyond the political scope. 
According to the case study, Germany also can ​be considered as a functional actor              
too. Firstly​, it derives from the fact that Germany is not a securitizing actor regarding               
active support to build NS2. Secondly​, this Member State, ​as well as Russia,             
considers that the objectives of the project ​are limited only by the commercial             
purposes. From German view, neither the EU energy security nor the national            
security might ​be threatened by ​the implementation of the gas project. The pipeline’s             
proponent stands by a strict principle of division between political and economic            
aspects in this case, albeit sometimes it raises the question of transit zone regarding              
Ukraine (Harper, 2018). 
As long as the discussion on NS2 has put on the agenda, Germany takes a cautious                
approach to comment this issue. With ​the intention of the commercial benefits, two             
German companies such as Wintershall and Uniper agreed to sign a financial            
agreement with 10% each to invest the project. As NS2 will turn Germany is ​indeed               
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 a gas hub in Europe, the political leaders point out about this project only under the                
economic spectrum. The former German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, is an          
advocate of gas offshores via the Baltic Sea. In the past, he was a proactive supporter                
of Nord Stream and run for the head of the shareholders' committee of Nord Stream               
AG, and in 2016 he became a manager of Nord Stream 2 (Noak, 2017). Thus, being                
in favour of these projects during the whole time of the discussion, he denies all               
politicisation issues which might put the questions of legal basis and the potential             
possibility of cancellation of Nord Stream 2. Despite, it should ​be noted that his              
position towards the gas pipeline cannot ​be seen as the official German            
announcement ​slightly ​it somewhat influenced the dynamic of public debates in           
Germany. 
Dismissing the political side of the gas project, the Social Democratic Party in             
Germany tried to win support among the EU to implement the project. The political              
leaders of party argue that NS2 can ​be perceived as an economic deal to ensure ​the                
security of gas supply. As maintained ​by the fact that it will double the capacity of                
NS1 to flow the natural gas to the EU, Social Democrats see the meaningful pros of a                 
project that should ​be realised at the set date. The situation ​slightly ​changed after              
Bundestag election in September 2017, when Social Democrats went into opposition.           
Still, Germany is in favour to build the gas pipeline and ​is willing to permit to run                 
Nord Stream 2. ​Indeed, the voice of the current German Chancellor, Angela Merkel,             
can ​be considered as the official state’s position about the ongoing pipeline. During             
the meeting with Polish Prime Minister, she stressed that “We think this is an              
economic project. We are also for energy diversification...” (King, 2018, February           
16). Therefore, the German stance on NS2 is to convince the other Member States              
that the gas offshore has ​merely ​the economic objectives. 
It should ​be noted that besides Russia and Germany, Austria, France, Netherlands            
also can ​be perceived as the functional actors in ​the context of ​the Nord Stream 2                
pipeline. ​The investment of their companies ​in the building of gas offshore and             
avoiding a discussion on NS2 in the political frame can ​be considered as their              
consent to construct it. In June 2017, after the United States State approved the              
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 sanctions against Russia, the former Federal Chancellor of Austria, Christian Kern           
with the former German Foreign Minister Gabriel Sigmar announced their discontent           
with this decision. In fact, they highlighted ​the importance of NS2 as the further step               
in the EU energy development “We cannot, however, accept the threat of illegal             
extraterritorial sanctions being imposed on European companies that are ​participating          
in efforts to expand Europe’s energy supply network!” (Federal Foreign Office,           
2017, June 15). Following this stance on the gas project, at the end of February 2018                
during ​the meeting with Vladimir Putin in Moscow, the Austrian Chancellor           
Sebastian Kurz on behalf of Austria had expressed the support to ​the building of the               
ongoing project. Being ​entirely ​dependent of Russian gas, the country sees the            
reasonable benefits such as the ensuring of gas supply in the future​. ​Nonetheless,             
the positions of “German friends” to influence the views of the Member States who              
against this project and the public debates is less noticeable (Reuters, 2018, 28             
February). The official claims of the political leaders ​are limited in the media             
coverage which does not allow to make the further assumptions. 
Overall, the dynamic of public debates derives from the countries-supporters that           
will benefit the most from exercising the gas project. As these states ​are included in               
the different blocs such as Germany is one of the most potent MS in the EU and                 
Russia is an enemy to Europe over the past few years, both ​of them ​have the same                 
point of view concerning ​the construction of the gas pipeline. Still, this division of              
blocs can explain the crucial difference in motives. In case Russia perceives the             
offshore as a “strong political weapon” to mitigate the relations with the EU and to               
some extent control it, the German objectives lead on state’s benefits regarding profit             
and its transformation to a gas hub in the EU. Therefore, to affect the dynamic of                
securitizing movement and to change ​the opinion of opponents, Russia and Germany            
use the similar frame of statements to implement this project by presenting NS2 as a               
commercial venture beyond the political scope. ​Moreover, Germany also strives to           
convince that this project applies to the Third Energy Package in the matter of              
ensuring ​the diversification of​ gas supply. 
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 4.4. Discussion of findings 
Whereas the Copenhagen School stands out the securitizing actors in the form of             
bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, the analysis interprets ​mostly ​speech acts         
which ​are performed by the political leaders who speak on behalf of their             
governments and states. Firstly​, Prime Ministers, Foreign, Defense, and Energy          
Ministers, members of the national parliaments are the main securitizing actors.           
Notably​, in Swedish case, the municipality authorities are also appeared such as            
securitizing actors. However, at the same time, the Karlshamn Municipality might ​be            
distinguished like the functional actors as it permitted to use its territory. It can ​be               
seen that municipality ​extensively ​affect the dynamic of the process of securitization            
by shifting the issue from the securitizing movement to economic sphere.           
Accordingly ​to the theory, the empirical part did not include the utterances of other              
actors who do not have the legitimate power to claim an existential threat. Therefore,              
the empirical analysis focused ​merely ​on the securitizing actors who are the            
authoritative representatives. 
Due to the analysis, the speech acts of the particular Member States are various in               
form and expression. The findings indicated that four countries distinguish the           
project as an issue of highest priority despite the fact that commonly, they did not use                
the word security in their speech acts. Instead, the securitizing actors uttered words             
such as “threat”, “Russian political project”, “environment risk” to characterise the           
Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Based on the external aspects of the facilitating conditions,             
neither the relations between speaker and audience nor the features of a threat to              
facilitate/impede securitization can be measured and evaluated, as the audience and           
the future shifting from securitizing movement remains unaccounted. For this reason,           
the analysis disregards the measure of the influence of the speech acts on the relevant               
audience. 
While the existential threat is clarified (Table 2, page 59), the question what might be               
threatened by the building of the gas project refers to the objectives of the European               
energy policy. Here it reveals on the creation of Energy Union and its primary goals               
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 such as diversification of energy supply and increasing the renewable energy.           
Moreover, NS2 can be seen as a security problem regarding violating the provisions             
of Gas Directive 2009/73/EC and Security of Gas Supply Regulation and its updating             
in 2016. Whereas in the political sector the systemic referent objects are the core of               
the international order according to the Copenhagen School, in the study case it             
refers to the EU regulations which constitute the regional political order and the             
central directions of its policy. Specifically, by implementing this project, Poland,           
Latvia, Denmark see the overreliance on the one gas supplier, Russia, who might not              
be considered as an active partner in the current circumstances. While the latter one              
is not an inherent part of the theory, the analysis does not eliminate the option to                
include them in the political domain. As follows, the goals of the Energy Union and               
the principle of diversification can be perceived as the essential pillars of the regional              
political order which should be adhered to avoid the fragmentation of the EU. 
Table 2. The elements of the speech acts.  
Elements/ 
Countries 
Referent objects Extraordinary 
measures 
Existential threat 
Poland -goals of the Energy Union 
-principle of diversification 
-European Solidarity 
- foreign policy of  the EU in 
the scope of the Ukrainian 
crisis 
 
-US sanctions 
-Baltic Pipe 
NS2 
Latvia -goals of the Energy Union 
-Unity and solidarity of the 
Baltic States 
- the EU 
-environment 
 
-not mentioned NS2 
Denmark -Energy Security 
-EU foreign policy interests 
-national defense policy 
 
-amendment to the 
law 
NS2 
Sweden -national defense interests -forbidden to 
leasing port 
NS2 
Source: author’s own elaboration.  
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 Poland and Latvia also brought out with a conclusion that a referent object is the               
goals of the current EU policy towards the Ukrainian war. In detail, their             
considerations derive from the recent Brussels policy which declared the extension of            
sanctions against Russia, imposed over the Ukrainian crisis. At that point, having a             
commercial deal with the state who stands on the opposite side of order which the               
EU maintains is a big challenge. In particular, bypassing Ukraine, this project can be              
seen as a respectively important tool for Russia to expand the war conflict. Apart              
from this, Brussels disregards the evaluation of inevitable consequences for Ukraine           
regarding losing the status of transit country and reducing the economic fees.            
Accordingly to the claims of securitizing actors, mainly Polish and Latvia           
politicians, the state that violated the principles of international law might not be             
seen as a reliable partner even though the German authorities present it as a purely               
commercial project. 
Polish and Latvian authorities repeatedly underlined that the proposed gas pipeline           
would threaten solidarity and trust among the EU Member States. This assumption            
shows that the status of a referent object based on the European unity which in turn                
means that NS2 would cause the division between the Member States. Furthermore,            
as a consequence, it might challenge a further integration of the European Union.             
This defined object applies to the political sector of the theory which means the              
shifting of the securitization process beyond the state-centric security scope. Thus,           
while the security is declared on the name of the EU, it is an evidence of a regional                  
level of the process of securitization.  
Examining the speech acts of Denmark and Sweden the referent object is appealed to              
their defense policy, namely, goals which can be threatened by using their territory to              
construct the pipeline. In the main, using their territorial waters and exclusive            
economic zones, the countries would be more reluctant as a sole shareholder of NS2,              
Gazprom, would have official permission to their territory, and ports in Swedish            
case. Furthermore, giving the green light to construct the pipeline will be considered             
as one more step to closer relations with Russia. However, both states are not              
satisfied with the future perspective of rapprochement. Denmark and Sweden feel           
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 that their territory should be protected from the Russian interference there. In the             
comparison of the CS and the case study, securitizing actors claimed NS2 as a threat               
towards their priorities of defense policy. Therefore, the particular referent object can            
be characterised by the legitimate claim to survival as any threat towards the defense              
policy is closely tied to the sovereignty of the country and cannot be disregarded in               
the legal context. 
As the Copenhagen School points out two distinct types of the referent objects within              
the scope of the environmental security such as environment itself and synthesis of             
environment and civilisation, Latvia referred to the former which can be existentially            
threatened. Importantly, the referent object shreds of evidence about the existential           
nature of security beyond the state. Whereas the securitizing actor neglected the            
extent to which technology can negative side-effects of the particular region, he            
called to take into consideration the environmental consequences. In the meantime,           
other securitizing actors does not mention this referent object which makes it less             
vulnerable in the context of the building of NS2. Thus, the environmental aspect of              
the securitizing movement is narrow enough in the particular case study. 
By defining the referent objects, the securitizing actors clarified that there are the             
elements which might be threatened in case the Nord Stream 2 project will become              
operational. The analysis proves the trend of different referent objects by the selected             
countries. With this in mind, the Member States deduces the possibility of            
threatening the political, environment and energy issues. The unification of them in            
one context such as the building of the pipeline illustrates the higher probability of              
facilitating the further process of securitization. Regarding a right of survival, the            
goals of the Energy Union, the principle of diversification, imposed sanctions on            
Russia, the territorial sovereignty of Member States are legally binding in the EU             
structure and the national systems. As a result, their nature enables to legitimise an              
extraordinary measure beyond the ordinary politics in case of the successful           
securitization. 
In turn to the extraordinary measures, the securitizing actors recommending them via            
their speech acts. The main aim of the proposed actions is to cancel the Nord Stream                
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 2 pipeline. The Polish stance on the extraordinary measure can be found regarding             
the building of Baltic Pipe and further development of LNG terminals. Nonetheless,            
a definition of these actions in light of an extraordinary measure disregards the             
feature of the breaking rules and leaving the scope of typical politics. Furthermore,             
the Latvian authorities did not clarify which actions they will take beyond the usual              
politics to protect the referent objects. Similarly, the securitizing actors from Sweden            
did not declare any extra steps which a country would take. At the same time, both                
states pointed out the responsibility of EU institutions to implement the extraordinary            
measures. 
In substance, Denmark can be considered as the first country among selected that had              
already handled an extraordinary measure to cancel the project. Passing the law in             
November 2017 to forbidden NS2 to run through the Danish territorial water on the              
security ground can be perceived as extraordinary Danish measure to block the gas             
pipeline. Nevertheless, a drawback of this determination lies in the legal basis of its              
adopting whereas the CS attributes this measure as the action beyond the scope of the               
normal politics (Ibid.). Moreover, to take an extraordinary step means the acceptance            
of securitized issue that can be traced only in the Danish environment, but not by any                
means in the EU. Thus, the Danish law might change the route of the gas pipeline                
and in this regard, will ensure national security. Despite, handling this extraordinary            
measure cannot be evidence to prevent threats within an EU level. In other words,              
NS2 would instead bypass Danish territorial water; still, this action would not cancel             
the gas project. 
Moreover, the findings showed that the frame of functional actors is quite limited in              
the Copenhagen school as it does not present the detailed outline of its nature and               
structure. Albeit, in the particular case study, Russia and Germany as the primary             
functional actors affect the dynamic of the securitizing movement such as they            
present the gas project merely in the economic scope. In many ways, Germany has              
made the efforts to convince the securitizing actors, the Member States, in the safety              
of the projects and its profit. From the Russian side, Gazprom and the political              
leaders make sure the EU has the lack of evidence to declare NS2 as a threat to the                  
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 environment in the Baltic Region as there will be the insignificant effect on it.              
Therefore, while the role of functional actors is not well-developed by the proponents             
of securitization theory and the empirical part provides a limited analysis of them,             
this issue  requires a further research. 
Overall, the empirical part provided the analysis of speech acts of securitizing actors,             
referent objects, extraordinary measures and functional actors. It can be concluded           
that the referent objects elaborate within the different aspects and levels. The            
particular gas project is perceived as a threat towards the national as well as the EU                
policies. For this reason, the securitizing movement involves two levels, respectively           
national and regional. The latter relates to the sum of the national securities, which              
have attempted to prevent the threat towards an EU level. Moreover, taking into             
account the content of referent objects, the analysis disregards the economic domain            
as political and energy concerns dominate. The defined extraordinary measures          
characterise the limitation because of the frame of the Copenhagen School which            
does not provide the clear distinction between these actions and politics according to             
the rules (Buzan et al., 1998). While the proposed actions by Sweden and Denmark              
aim to prevent their involvement in the project at the national level, the Polish              
suggestion of the imposing the US sanctions on the project is an action to cancel the                
building at all. Finally, the analysis of functional actors has proven that they indeed              
affect the dynamic of the process by trying to shift NS2 from the securitizing move               
to the economic spectrum. However, to which extent they influence the process of             
securitization is unaccounted as the analysis follows merely a securitizing movement.  
 
 
 
63 
 5. Conclusion 
Answering the research question, the findings of thesis assess that all particular            
countries interpret the Nord Stream 2 pipeline as a current threat towards the EU as               
well as the Member States. Accurately, the research illustrated the securitization of            
NS2 across Poland, Latvia, Denmark, and Sweden by analyzing the speech acts of             
their authorities. Upon the objectives of the study, it has shown that particular energy              
issue is at the level of the securitizing movement. For this reason, the audience was               
excluded from the analysis as at the specific stage this actor does not involve. One               
can affirm that title of thesis widely applied to the securitization in the context of               
NS2 within underpinning the political significance. This assumption derives from the           
analysis of the speech acts and the nature of the referent objects. Mainly, the notion               
of securitization is appraised as the process, however, indeed not like the result. 
Being the staunch opponents of having a gas deal with Russia, the countries             
underlined the various referent objects, which should be protected. This distinction           
can be explained by different backgrounds which generated by the specific state’s            
concerns. However, mostly the referent objectives can be unified under the political            
dimension such as the goals of EU foreign policy, the unity of the EU and the                
sovereignty of Nordic countries. The energy objects that should be protected are the             
principles of the Energy Union and Gas Directive which are going beyond the scope              
of the political dimension. Besides, the Danish and Latvian authorities also marked            
the environment which might keep safe from the harmful impact in the case of              
implementation of the project. Importantly, the Swedish securitizing actors made an           
accent on the referent object in term of the national security, avoiding the claims of               
energy-related consequences. Altogether, the particular Member States understand        
NS2 as a threat regarding different referent objects. Still, all of them have one              
common aim, to block its construction. 
A drawback of the theoretical framework is a lack of energy domain in its structure.               
While for this reason, the definition of referent objectives and extraordinary           
measures are not well-structured, the approach of a sector’s synthesis elaborated the            
64 
 broader spectrum within two levels, national and regional. Hence, in line with the             
limitation of theory, it extracted the multi-dimensional nature of the energy issue.            
Furthermore, the empirical part solely pertains to the speech acts of securitizing            
actors due to the aim of the research question. With this intention, the paper is               
limited in detail policy analysis of the particular Member States. The examination of             
functional actors falls short by estimating the degree of their impact on the             
discussion. Finally, the spatial time of research can be seen as an asset as well as the                 
limitation. Whereas the process of securitization is ongoing, analysis cannot provide           
the final stage of securitization/desecuritization.  
On the whole, up to now, the energy issue does not tend to shift to the level of                  
successful securitization as traditionally it is profoundly a political concern and does            
not gain the area of urgency. Consequently, the gas pipeline is securitized to the              
extent of the first stage of the securitization process - securitizing movement. The             
findings revealed that the speech act approach of the Copenhagen School helped to             
explore the research question. Nonetheless, the mentioned above flaws found in the            
analysis narrow enough and biased concerning the European frame towards this           
project. The research also disregards the influence of the USA on the stance of              
securitizing actors and its critical concerns towards the ongoing pipeline. Albeit           
limited in scope, the paper induces the dominance of a political dimension in the              
energy issue and its effect to securitize it. The referent objects as a substantial part of                
analysis corroborated the different backgrounds of the selected Member States.          
Unlikely this, the official stance on NS2 as the Russian political tool for             
manipulation rather than an economic project made them form a bloc of opposition.             
Regarding the degree of speech acts’ effectiveness, currently, as it has been            
mentioned, the European Commision put on the agenda of the question on the legal              
basis of the gas offshore and proposed the amendment to the Gas Directive             
2009/73/EC on November 8, 2017, to ensure the transparency and competition           
between the gas companies (European Commission, 2017, November 8). Despite,          
this question remains unresolved, and it is still early to talk about acceptance by the               
audience. 
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